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IN THE COURT OP APPEALS OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
H. LeROY COBABE, LEWIS R. CANFIELD, : 
and ST, GEORGE TOYOTA, INC., 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, : 
vs. : Case No. 880567-CA 
B. GLEN CRAWFORD, PAULA CRAWFORD, and : Argument Priority 
CRAWFORD INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah : Classification: 14.b 
limited partnership, : 
Defendants-Appellants. : 
JURISDICTION OP UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is from an order of dismissal with prejudice 
entered on July 13, 1988, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in 
and for Washington County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Philip 
Eves presiding. (See Record, Vol. II [hereinafter II], at 91-92.) 
Jurisdiction for appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was conferred 
pursuant to Rule 3(a), Rules of Utah Supreme Court. Appellants 
perfected their appeal with the district court on August 10, 1988. 
(II at 126-133) Thereafter, the Utah Supreme Court transmitted 
this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to its vested 
authority, over the signature of Geoffrey J. Butler. (II at 138) 
This case was initiated by Respondents in December of 
1985, seeking $100,000 in liquidated damages, lost profits, costs, 
and attorney's fees solely alleging Appellants' breach of a cove-
nant not to compete. (See Record, Vol. I [hereinafter I], at 3.) 
Appellants answered, denying their breach, and requested attor-
ney's fees in defending the suit pursuant to Section 78-27-56 of 
the Utah Code Annotated, or, alternatively, "as provided in the 
parties* contract." (I at 24) Trial was set for June 22 and 23 
of 1988. (II at 26) Less than one month prior to trial, Respon-
dents filed a motion, absent any supportive memorandum or rule of 
civil procedure, requesting the district court to dismiss their 
complaint solely because Respondents were then "unable to further 
prosecute the suit." (II at 35) This motion was initially heard 
on June 7, 1988. At that time, Respondents indicated that they 
might be agreeable to a dismissal with prejudice. (Reporter's 
Transcript, June 7, 1988 [hereinafter Tl], at 4.) Respondents, 
however, resisted Appellants1 responsive contention that in the 
event of dismissal, Appellants were entitled, as prevailing 
parties, to present evidence of their attorney's fees. Barring 
that, Appellants resisted dismissal of the claim. (Xd. at 6; see 
also, II at 40.) 
Despite Appellants1 counsel's indications to the dis-
trict court that, after 30 months of litigation, he was prepared 
to go forward with evidence as to Appellants' attorney's fees, 
subject to cross examination, the lower court denied Appellants 
this opportunity. (See Reporter's Transcript, June 20, 19 88 
[hereafter T2], at 8-9.) The lower court's rationale was as 
follows: 
Having reviewed the memoranda filed by 
the counsel, the motion to dismiss is granted. 
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The trial date which was this Wednesday is 
vacated. 
The motion for attorney's fees is denied. 
The reason being that it is apparent from the 
pleadings in the file that the reason the 
Plaintiffs have sought to dismiss the case is 
not because they feel they have not prevailed 
or could not prevail, but because they were 
under extreme financial pressures which pre-
vent them from going forward. 
Under those circumstances, I find that 
neither party has prevailed, and neither party 
is entitled to attorney's fees under the 
contract. (Id. at 9) 
From the above ruling, Appellants, who believe they prevailed as 
a matter of law and contract right, have brought this appeal. An 
examination of the record reveals that the judge's usage of the 
plural "memoranda" was incorrect; on June 20, 1988, only Appellants 
had filed a memorandum with the court. (II at 53) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Are Appellants (Defendants in the district court) 
prevailing parties where Respondents' case against them was 
dismissed with prejudice less than two days prior to trial? 
2. Are Appellants entitled to a hearing to set attor-
ney's fees as successful parties within the parameters of the 
parties' contractual agreement both for their counsel's work before 
the district court as well as on appeal? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Citations to constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, and rules, wherever appropriate, will occur in the text 
of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1976, Glen Crawford acquired a franchise from Toyota 
of America and operated in St. George under the name of Crawford 
Toyota for approximately nine years. (Deposition of Glen Crawford, 
November 17, 1986 [hereinafter GCI] at 27) On or about October of 
1984, Respondents Cobabe and Canfield approached Crawford in 
reference to purchasing Crawford Toyota. (Deposition of Lewis R. 
Canfield, November 18, 1986 [hereinafter LCI] at 40-41) Canfield 
had extensive expertise with automobile franchises and dealerships. 
(Id. at 1-41) Thereafter, Respondents Cobabe and Canfield retained 
Attorney John Palmer to negotiate the purchase of Crawford Toyota 
from Mr. Crawford. (Id. at 49-50) Subsequent thereto, c>n January 
24, 1985, an Agreement of Purchase and Sale of Assets was executed 
between Mr. Crawford, his wife Paula Crawford, and Crawford 
Investment Company and Respondents. A copy of the contract is 
attached hereto as Appendix 1, and was the contract pled by 
Respondents in the case below. (See I at 1-11.) Subsequently, an 
addendum was signed, but the material provisions of the original 
agreement incident to this appeal were not modified thereby. (See 
GCI, Depo. Ex. 3.) 
As part of the sales contract with Respondents, Appel-
lants agreed "not to compete with a new car franchise within a 30 
mile radius of currant [sic] dealership for a period of two (2) 
years from date of closing." (See Appendix 1, 5 2.) While perhaps 
immaterial at this juncture, this Court should understand that, as 
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referenced in the contractual agreement, the word "franchise" does 
not refer to the franchise being sold but rather the means by which 
Appellants were barred from competing in the St. George area. (See 
LCI at 85-86.) 
Several months after the sale, Crawford and other 
individuals not named in the complaint predictably obtained a used 
motor vehicle dealer's license under the name and sign of Desert 
Auto Sales. All the parties understood that Crawford contemplated 
this transition at the time of the sale of his franchise with 
Toyota. (See e.g. LCI at 60, 70.) 
At all applicable times herein, Section 41-3-7 of the 
Utah Code defined a used motor vehicle dealer as "a person engaged 
in the business of selling or exchanging used motor vehicles." 
Thereafter, Crawford, as a principal and salesman for Desert Auto 
Sales, sold used vehicles as allowed by Utah law. Significantly, 
in Utah at all applicable times herein, a used motor vehicle dealer 
could sell current model vehicles provided they were sold and 
licensed as used cars. (See Affidavit of John R. McKnight, I at 
198-99; see also Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-7.) 
Appellants believe that the record on appeal demonstrates 
that Respondents1 case was ill-conceived and meritless. As stated 
by Respondent Cobabe, the contractual clause did not prevent 
Crawford from going into the used car business or doing anything 
that a used car dealer could otherwise legally do, including 
selling current model cars in St. George. (See Deposition of H. 
LeRoy Cobabe, January 26, 1986 [hereinafter HLC], at 30-31, 33, 
5 
36.) This is all Crawford did. Significantly, Crawford never 
acquired a franchise from a manufacturer defined by § 41-3-7(12) 
of the Utah Code as "a contract or agreement between a motor 
vehicle dealer and a manufacturer of new motor vehicles or its 
distributor or factory branch by which the dealer is authorized to 
sell any specified make or makes of new motor vehicles." (See also 
the definition of "new motor vehicle dealer" § 41-3-7(17) Utah Code 
Ann.) 
On November 20, 1985, Respondents1 counsel sent a demand 
letter to Appellant Glen Crawford alleging Crawford's breach of the 
prior non-competition clause and requesting that Crawford execute 
a new expansive, two-page non-competition clause, comply with it 
in detail, and pay Respondents the sum of $30,000 in cash. (See 
LCI, Depo. Ex. A.) Crawford refused Respondents1 unilateral 
demands, and less than two weeks later, on December 3, 1985, 
Respondents filed their complaint. (I at 1) 
Significant to this appeal, Respondents1 complaint 
attached the January 24, 1985, agreement, alleged Appellants' 
renewed oral promise not to violate the same in September of 198 5, 
and requested $100,000 in liquidated damages, additional lost 
profits, together with all costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
bringing the action. (See I at 2-3, JI 4, 8, 11, 12, and 13.) 
Paragraph 23 of the parties' contract states their 
negotiated agreement pertaining to attorney's fees as follows: 
In the event of any litigation between the 
parties hereto to enforce any provision or 
rights hereunder, the unsuccessful party to 
such litigation shall pay to the successful 
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party therein all costs and expences [sic] 
expressly including, but not limited to, 
reasonable attorneys1 fees and court costs 
incurred herein by such successful party, 
which costs, expenses and attorney's fees and 
court costs incurred by such party or in 
connection with such litigation. 
There is only one cause of action pled in Respondents1 
complaint and only one contract which Respondents alleged gave rise 
to their damages. Paragraph 31 of that contract requires any 
modification thereof to be in writing executed by the parties 
thereto, of which there were five signatories. (Appendix 1) 
Appellants1 answer denied any breach and specifically set 
forth Appellants1 entitlement to attorney's fees as follows: 
As a further and separate affirmative defense, 
these Defendants allege that Plaintiffs' cause 
of action is without merit and is not brought 
or asserted in good faith, and, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56, these 
Defendants are entitled to a reasonable attor-
ney's fee for defense of each cause of action 
against it listed in Plaintiffs' complaint, or 
as provided in the parties' contract. 
WHEREAS, these Defendants pray that the Plain-
tiffs' complaint be dismissed as against these 
Defendants, and that these Defendants receive 
their costs incurred herein and for attorney's 
fees, and for such other and further relief as 
the Court deems just and equitable. 
(I at 24.) 
Respondents pursued their suit with vigor. Respondents 
noticed up five separate depositions comprising over 3 32 pages of 
transcribed testimony. Appellants noticed up three depositions 
comprising 199 pages of transcribed testimony. Respondents 
submitted three sets of interrogatories and two sets of requests 
for production of documents to Appellants. (See e.g., I at 13 5-
7 
141.) Appellants contented themselves with one set of interroga-
tories, one request for production of documents, and one series of 
requests for admissions. (Note: Appellants1 only request for 
production of documents, entitled "Second Request," was a misnomer. 
[I at 116].) 
Appellants' depositions taken of Respondents clearly 
indicate that Crawford could maintain a used car franchise and sell 
current-model cars in St. George without violating the non-competi-
tion clause as drafted between the parties. (See e.g., HLC at 3 0-
31, 33, 3 6.) Indeed, at the deposition of Dr. Cobabe, it became 
clear that Appellant Crawford had not broken the agreement as 
written, but that Respondents simply desired that the previous 
agreement, now unsatisfactory to them, be expanded. In calling Dr. 
Cobabe's attention to paragraph four of his complaint and the 
proposed Addendum to Agreement of Purchase and Sale, attached as 
Exhibit "A" (3 pp.) to the November 18th deposition of Lewis 
Canfield, Dr. Cobabe conceded that paragraph four of the complaint 
does not even correctly state the agreement as executed among the 
parties, but, rather, pleads the contractual provision as Dr. 
Cobabe "wished11 it had been written! (See HLC at 38-41.) 
Appellants, attempting to cut through the chaff of this 
litigation, moved for summary judgment and attorney's fees in 
December of 1987, together with supporting affidavits. (I at 196-
233) Respondents opposed the motion, filing a lengthy memorandum 
and affidavit contending, contrary to the written contract and Utah 
law as articulated in Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 
8 
356 (1970) , that two signatories to the written contract had 
somehow orally modified it. (II at 7-24) Despite the plethora of 
testimony and other evidence to the contrary, the lower court 
denied Appellants1 motion and set the matter for trial on June 22 
and 23 of 1988, at 9:30 a.m. 
Compromise Negotiations 
Compromise negotiations are, by their nature, normally 
inadmissable in evidence as a matter of public policy. (Rule 408, 
Utah Rules of Evidence) Respondents, however, openly set forth 
before the lower court their prior offer of dismissal; and Appel-
lants1 reply, which took the form of a letter drafted by Appel-
lants1 counsel dated May 18, 1988, was later attached to Respon-
dents1 counsel's affidavit. (II at 37-40) In reference to Respon-
dents1 offer to dismiss the case, Appellants1 position was abun-
dantly clear: 
At the present time, we are considering your 
offer, but feel that Mr. Crawford's attorney's 
fee should be partially compensated by the 
Plaintiffs. 
As a result thereof, I would make the follow-
ing counteroffer to you: First, that the 
matter be dismissed with prejudice on both 
sides, so that no further discovery time, 
attorney's fees, or costs need be incurred on 
behalf of Mr. Crawford. In addition thereto, 
Mr. Crawford would receive $1,000.00 a month 
from Mr. Cobabe, for a period of twelve 
months, to offset his attorney's fees. In 
exchange therefor, the matter would be dis-
missed with prejudice on the merits. (II at 
40) 
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The Respondents' Motion to Dismiss 
and Supportive Affidavit 
After receiving Appellants' refusal to dismiss without 
an assessment of fees, Respondents' counsel filed a notice of 
withdrawal; and, subsequent thereto, Respondents1 motion to 
dismiss. This motion does not state what rule Respondents relied 
on or whether such dismissal was sought with or without prejudice. 
(II at 33-40) The only affirmative statement is that Respondents 
requested dismissal because they were unable to further prosecute 
the suit. The entire text of their motion is as follows: 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFFS IN THE ABOVE ACTION 
AND move to dismiss the complaint against the 
Defendants on the grounds that the Plaintiffs 
are unable to further prosecute the same. (II 
at 35) 
Significantly, this motion was filed less than one month 
prior to trial. In their supportive affidavit, once again, 
Respondents failed to note whether they requested such dismissal 
with or without prejudice, but stated that despite Respondents' 
"belief in the merits of the suit, it . . . [was] not financially 
possible for Plaintiffs to continue the case." (See II at 37-38, 
especially J 7.) Regrettably, Respondents should have been more 
cautious when they filed their ill-conceived suit 3 0 months before. 
Not unsurprisingly, Respondents provided Appellants only five days' 
notice on their motion set for June 7, 1988. (II at 41-42) 
Respondents did not provide Appellants any authority in 
support of their motion until June 9, 1988, at which time, Respon-
dents mailed a one-page memorandum to Appellants. (See II at 8 0-
10 
81,) The original Respondents1 "memorandum" was never deposited 
with the lower court, although copies of Respondents1 cases were 
apparently placed in the file at II 43-52. Indeed, Respondents' 
"memorandum" appears in the file only because it is attached as an 
exhibit to a responsive Appellants1 memorandum. 
The Hearings 
Because Appellants believe that the preamble to the order 
of dismissal with prejudice prepared by Respondents' counsel 
misrepresents what occurred in this case, Appellants requested and 
received all three transcripts pertaining to entry of the order of 
dismissal with prejudice found at II 91-92. The first hearing, on 
Tuesday, June 7, 1988, clearly indicates that, while Appellants' 
counsel did not object to the case being dismissed, he did expect 
an opportunity on the 22nd and 23rd of June to go forward on the 
basis of attorney's fees expended in defending the case. (See Tl 
at 2-3.) Respondents' counsel, without tendering any authority to 
Appellants, then cited a case entitled Mobile Power Enterprises v. 
Power Vac, infra, at p. 21, and indicated to the lower court that 
this abortive opinion was consistent with other cases in which 
Plaintiffs had sought dismissal with prejudice. (Tl at 3-4) This 
was the first time Appellants knew that Respondents sought a 
dismissal with prejudice. Respondents thereafter cited two cases 
and indicated to the lower court that they had been unable to 
uncover any cases of dismissal with prejudice on the Plaintiffs' 
motion where attorney's fees had been awarded. (Id. at 5) 
Thereafter, Respondents' counsel indicated that, despite Appel-
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lants1 reliance on a contractual provision for attorney's fees, 
they were not entitled to the same by reason of the fact that 
Plaintiffs were dismissing because financial resources were 
otherwise exhausted. (Id. at 6) Thereafter, Appellants1 counsel 
indicated that barring an assessment of attorney's fees, Appellants 
would resist dismissal of Respondents' complaint. 
The second hearing was held Monday, June 20, 1988, only 
two days prior to the scheduled trial. At that time, Appellants' 
counsel tendered a copy of a responsive memorandum to the lower 
court indicating that the original had been filed with the clerk; 
and, indeed, this representation was accurate. (See II at 53; cf. 
incorrect preamble II at 91-92.) Respondents argued that to obtain 
attorney's fees Appellants were required to file a counterclaim. 
By reason of this, Respondents argued, Appellants could not be 
deemed the prevailing party. This was somehow made clear, they 
added, by the personal bankruptcy of one of the Respondents. (See 
T2 at 2-3.) Appellants' counsel argued that whether a dismissal 
was with or without prejudice, Defendants (Appellants here) would 
be prevailing parties, and this was even more so when the dismis-
sal was with prejudice. (See T2 at 5-7.) Appellants' counsel also 
noted to the lower court that Respondents should have addressed the 
expenses of litigation before filing, and that the record clearly 
reflected that "the majority of expenses incurred in this lawsuit 
was rsic] incurred on the motion or on the request under the 
discovery principles by the Plaintiffs, [t]hey drove up their own 
costs." (T2 at 7) Appellants' counsel also indicated he was 
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prepared to testify on attorney's fees, subject to cross-examina-
tion, two days later at the trial. (T2 at 8-9) That afternoon, 
the lower court, outside the presence of counsel, made the follow-
ing ruling correctly reported in three terse paragraphs: 
Having reviewed the memoranda filed by 
the counsel, the motion to dismiss is granted. 
The trial date which was this Wednesday is 
vacated. 
The motion for attorney's fees is denied. 
The reason being that it is apparent from the 
pleadings in the file that the reason the 
Plaintiffs have sought to dismiss the case is 
not because they feel they have not prevailed 
or that they could not prevail, but because 
they were under extreme financial pressures 
which prevent them from going forward. 
Under those circumstances, I find that 
neither party has prevailed, and neither party 
is entitled to attorney's fees under the 
contract. (T2 at 9) 
Simply stated, even though Appellants obtained a dismis-
sal with prejudice of Respondents1 case against them, Appellants 
were unsuccessful because Respondents felt that, if they had the 
money to fund the suit, they might win. The Wests keynote might 
read as follows: Plaintiffs' speculations cause loss to defen-
dants. And, though Respondents could not expense the trial, 
Appellants' counsel is quite sure they will uncover the funds to 
defend the appeal. (II at 40) 
Basically stated, the lower court found that after two 
and one-half years of extensive litigation, where Plaintiffs 
decided less than a month prior to trial that they did not want to 
go forward because they could not afford it, Defendants, having 
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obtained a dismissal of Plaintiffs1 cause of action with prejudice, 
had, nonetheless, not prevailed. 
Respondents1 counsel, whose withdrawal had not yet been 
granted, prepared an order of dismissal with prejudice. (II at 91-
92; Tl at 7) Appellants objected to the proposed order because the 
preamble thereto was nothing more than a self-serving statement. 
(See II at 75-79.) Indeed, the entire preamble does not recite one 
argument set forth by Appellants for an award of attorney's fees 
based upon the parties1 contractual agreement. Appellants hcive 
even heard that Respondents may, in effect, argue on appeal that 
Appellants stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice without an 
award of fees. The executed order appealed from contains one 
finding of fact and two conclusions of law. They are as follows: 
1. The parties are in agreement that the 
case should be dismissed with prejudice. 
2. There is no reason the Court should 
not dismiss the case with prejudice. 
3. Neither party has prevailed in this 
action, and neither party to this suit is 
"successful" within the meanings of the terms 
of the agreement entitling an award of attor-
ney's fees. (See II at 92.) 
The order of dismissal with prejudice found in the record 
at II, 91-93, was never mailed in*its executed form by Respondents' 
counsel or the court to Appellants' counsel. (See II at 93.) As 
a result, on July 21, 1988, Appellants' counsel was, as yet, 
unaware that any order had been signed. (See Transcript July 21, 
1988 [hereinafter T3] at 2-3.) Appellants' counsel at this hearing 
indicated that Respondents' counsel had earlier agreed to the entry 
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of an order proposed for the district court's signature found at 
II 85-86. (Id.) Appellants' counsel's major inquiry then per-
tained to the executed order's preamble's inferences that the 
district court did not consider Appellants' arguments, or that they 
had somehow been untimely submitted. The district court, to allay 
any problems this Court may have, responded as follows: 
I did not read the order that way in the first 
place. And if that's what you want me to 
cover, I certainly did have your arguments in 
mind and had received your arguments at the 
time I made the decision. (T3 at 4.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The parties in the case at bar executed a contract 
which provided that, in the event of litigation, the "successful" 
party was entitled, inter alia, to attorney's fees. The lower 
court, cognizant of this provision, found that, despite the 
resultant dismissal of Respondents' case with prejudice, Appellants 
had not been successful. The dismissal, however, was in conformity 
with Appellants' prayer for relief and was legally equivalent to 
a favorable judgment on the merits after trial. As attorney's 
fees, when allowed by contract, are allowed in Utah as a matter of 
law, the judicial failure to designate Appellants as prevailing 
parties is an unconscionable and onerous redrafting of the parties' 
contract. 
II. Appellants are entitled to attorney's fees in 
pursuing this appeal. This result is mandated by the Utah Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Management Services Corp. v. Development 
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Assoc,r infra, at p. 21. 
III. Respondents' lead case recited below is inapposite 
to this case, and, despite its limited applicability in general, 
has been highly criticized. That case, Mobile Power Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Power Vac, Inc., infra, at 21, involved a plaintiff who had 
received a satisfactory monetary settlement of its diversity claims 
from other named defendants. Plaintiff then sought a dismissal 
with prejudice against the other named defendants, who in turn 
requested attorneyfs fees. The court, in Mobile Power, held that 
defendants had not properly pled any contract upon which an awcird 
of fees could be based. But, with all deference to Mobile Power, 
the opinion confused the issue of awarding attorney's fees with 
that of determining a prevailing party. Thus, Mobile Power held 
defendants were not even entitled to costs, citing Smoot v. Fox, 
340 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1964). But in Smoot, defendants had been 
found to prevail and were awarded costs. Subsequent federal 
citators and case law have noted Mobile Power's limited applicabil-
ity and the confusing and, indeed, illogical nature of the court's 
rationale. Regardless, the case at bar is not one where any Defen-
dant settled with Plaintiffs or modified its behavior in any regard 
arguably favorable to Plaintiffs. Respondents, Plaintiffs below, 
obtained nothing by way of their complaint. 
IV. Utah case law supports Appellants' proposition that 
they are prevailing parties as a matter of law. This is particu-
larly so where Plaintiffs, on the eve of trial, declined to go 
forward on the merits of their suit. Simply stated, a prevailing 
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party is one in whose favor an affirmative judgment is rendered. 
Dismissal of Respondents1 case with prejudice amounts to an 
affirmative judgment in favor of Appellants. It cannot be logi-
cally seen in any other light. 
V. Numerous other jurisdictions support Appellants1 
proposition that they are the prevailing party as a matter of law. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in 1981, quoted favorably cases from both 
Florida and Washington. Both these jurisdictions would soundly and 
summarily reject the lower court's reasoning. Cases from Oregon 
and Arizona also support Appellants1 position that a dismissal of 
Respondents1 case with prejudice renders Appellants prevailing 
parties for the, purpose of awarding costs, and, where available, 
attorney's fees. 
VI. The lower court reasoned that Appellants did not 
prevail because Respondents indirectly indicated, through their 
counsel, that if they had the funds to pursue a trial, Respondents 
thought they might prevail. This rationale is untenable. Respon-
dents, not Appellants, drove up the cost of litigation in the case 
at bar. Furthermore, an analysis of Respondents' case reveals it 
to be what Appellants' counsel affectionately refers to as a 
"Bowser" — a doggy case with a lot of bark but no bite. Regard-
less, neither Respondents' nor Appellants' subjective feelings as 
to the merits of Respondents' suit are material; once the same is 
dismissed with prejudice, absent any consideration in exchange 
therefor, Appellants have prevailed. 
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VII. There is no presumption of validity which attaches 
to the portion of the lower court's opinion appealed from below. 
Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. is inapplicable because there was no trial on 
the merits. Indeed, as the lower court's ruling as to who pre-
vailed amounts to a conclusion of law, the ruling is not entitled 
to any special deference on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE ARBITRARY DENIAL OP ANY ATTORNEY'S FEE TO 
APPELLANTS IN THIS CASE AMOUNTS TO A JUDICIAL 
REWRITING OF THE CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES 
It has long been held that the purpose of contracts is 
to reduce to writing the terms and conditions upon which the 
parties have met and to fix their rights and duties in respect 
thereto. A lower court's desire to modify or ignore, subtly or 
otherwise, clearly expressed contractual obligations of the parties 
is rarely countenanced on appeal and often results in little more 
than a judicial rewriting of the parties' contract. (See e.g. , 
Dalton v. Jericho, 642 P.2d 748 [Utah 1982]; Jensen v. Bouwhuis, 
577 P.2d 555 [Utah 1978]; Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 
163, 321 P. 2d 221 [1958].) This Appellate disdain for judicially 
rewritten contracts is equally applicable to the attorney's fees 
provisions thereof. (See Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P. 2d 391 [Utah 
1984] .) 
In the instant case, Appellants did prevail below. The 
purpose of Appellants' defense was to ethically obtain the 
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dismissal of Respondents1 case with prejudice, whether by trial or 
otherwise. Appellants had a right, arising from their contract as 
the successful party, to an assessment of attorney's fees. By 
denying these attorney's fees, the lower court has frustrated the 
objective expectations of the parties and effectively deleted in 
substance paragraph 23 of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale of 
Assets executed January 24, 1985. (See Appendix 1, 5 23.) 
It is the accepted rule in Utah that attorney's fees 
cannot be recovered unless provided for by contract or statute. 
(Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667 [Utah 
1982].) This rule is met in the present case, and the lower court 
should not "ignore the parties' arms-length transaction" in regard 
to attorney's fees. (See Jenkins v. Bailey, supra.) In the 
Jenkins case, appellant's counsel successfully argued to the Utah 
Supreme Court that, absent a "compelling or persuasive precedent 
that supports an exception from the general rule," the denial of 
an award of attorney's fees "can only be seen as error." (Jenkins, 
supra, at 392-393) The fact that one of the Respondents filed a 
personal bankruptcy, or, alternatively, that Respondents, as the 
record indicates, expensed themselves out of their own lawsuit, 
hardly seem compelling reasons to ignore the contractual provisions 
executed by Respondents upon which they also initially sought 
relief in the form of attorney's fees. Ultimately, the lower 
court's ruling precluded Appellants' ,counsel from proceeding at 
the time of trial with testimony, subject to cross-examination, 
pertaining to a reasonable amount of attorney's fees. 
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As stated in Turtle Management, Inc, supra, attorney's 
fees must be provided by contract or statute. When they are 
provided on .either basis, however, their allowance is a matter of 
legal right. For example, in Cabrerra v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 
(Utah 1985), a party had been awarded attorney's fees in the 
successful defense of a case arising out of a uniform real estate 
contract, which commonly carries contractual terms for the award 
of a reasonable attorney's fee. On appeal, Appellants contended 
that attorney's fees were a matter of equity and should be denied. 
This contention was unanimously and soundly rejected by all five 
of the present judges of the Utah Supreme Court in an opinion 
authored by Justice Stewart. His paragraph rejecting this conten-
tion is directly applicable to the instant case: 
Furthermore, contrary to Appellant's 
contention that attorneys fees should be 
determined on the basis of an equitable stan-
dard, attorneys fees, when awarded as allowed 
by law, are awarded as a matter of legal 
right. (Id. at 625, emphasis added) 
II. 
APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 
IN PURSUING THE APPEAL 
In Management Services Corp. v. Development Assoc., 617 
P.2d 406 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court, citing with approval 
the Colorado case of Zambruk v. Perlmutter 3rd Generation Builders, 
510 P.2d 472 (Colo. App. 1973), stated that in order to fully and 
contractually indemnify a prevailing party, attorney's fees should 
be awarded in the event of a successful appeal. Similarly here, 
in the event the Court of Appeals remands this case for trial on 
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the issue of attorney's fees, it is respectfully submitted that the 
remand should include an assessment of attorney's fees incident to 
the perfection of the appeal in this matter. (Id. ; see also, 
Cabrerra v. Cottrell, supra; Centurian Corporation v. Cripps, 624 
P.2d 706, 713 [Utah 1981].) 
III. 
THE LEAD CASE RELIED ON BY RESPONDENTS BEFORE 
THE LOWER COURT IS INAPPOSITE TO THE INSTANT 
CASE, VERY LIMITED IN ITS APPLICABILITY, AND 
HIGHLY CRITICIZED 
Respondents1 counsel sought denial of Appellants1 
attorney's fees in the court below primarily based upon the federal 
case of Mobile Power Enterprises, Inc. v. Power Vac, Inc., 496 F.2d 
1311 (10th Cir. 1974). (See Tl at 3-4.) Indeed, Respondents indi-
cated that the Mobile Power case was "consistent with other cases 
in which a plaintiff seeks a dismissal with prejudice," and that 
under these circumstances, the trial court "lacks power to allow 
costs, barring exceptional circumstances, if the dismissal is 
without prejudice." (Id.) An examination of Mobile Power, 
however, reveals that decision's limited inapplicability to the 
case at bar. Furthermore, Mobile Power has also been criticized 
for both misinterpreting the law or as simply being an anomalous, 
confusing decision. 
In Mobile Power, Mobile filed suit against Power Vac, 
Inc. and Anilas Corporation. Subsequently, Mobile obtained a 
satisfactory offer of settlement from Power Vac and, accepting the 
same, sought an order of dismissal with prejudice against both 
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defendants. Anilas Corporation then sought attorney's fees under 
an Oklahoma statute, claiming it was a prevailing party. The 
Mobile Power court held that, where Mobile had elected to settle 
and receive its full monetary recovery from Power Vac, co-defendant 
Anilas was not thusly transformed into a prevailing party. The 
court further held that it had no contractual authority to award 
Anilas costs because Anilas had technically failed under federal 
law to plead the contractual provision allowing for"fees prior to 
dismissal of the case. (See Mobile Power, supra at 1312-1313.) 
Importantly, however, in Mobile Power there were two distinguishing 
factors: (1) The plaintiff Mobile Power had indeed prevailed in 
that it had received a satisfactory settlement offer from one of 
the two named defendants, resulting in monetary recovery to the 
plaintiff; and (2) the federal appellate court noted that there was 
no authority by statute or rule, or by reliance upon any written 
contract, on which to award defendant Anilas costs and fees. In 
the case at bar, Respondents sued all of the Appellants and 
received absolutely nothing from their efforts. Furthermore, there 
is contractual authority clearly relied on by Appellants in the 
pleadings for an award of fees. 
Following the Mobile Power case in search of the consis-
tency elucidated by Respondents' counsel is, at best, difficult. 
(Tl at 3-4) In Ryan v. Hatfield, 578 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1978), 
the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, cited Mobile 
Power as calling for the equitable award of attorney's fees when 
plaintiff's action is dismissed without prejudice in the absence 
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of a contract or statute authorizing the same. (Id. at 277.) The 
rationale, apparently, is that otherwise the Defendants would be 
unduly prejudiced by the dismissal in the event plaintiff there-
after chose to refile its action. But in Ryan, as in Mobile Power, 
there were no contracts or statutes which could be relied on 
authorizing an award of fees. 
In 6 Moore's Federal Practice, § 54.70 Pocket Part, at 
22, n. 16, in reference to textual p. 1310, the authors criticize 
Mobile Power as follows: 
When an action is dismissed by the plain-
tiff without prejudice the court may award 
expenses and attorney's fees as well as 
statutory costs, but when dismissal is with 
prejudice, the rule is otherwise. Smoot v. Fox 
(CA 6th, 1965) 353 F.2d 830, 9 FR Serv. 2d 
41a.26, Case 1. See also. Mobile Power, . . . 
[Id. ] In the latter decision it is stated 
that when a voluntary dismissal is with 
prejudice the court "lacks power to award 
costs, barring exceptional circumstances," 
citing Smoot v. Fox, supra. With deference, 
this appears to b.e incorrect. In Smoot, costs 
were awarded. See, Smoot v. Fox, (CA 6th, 
1964) 340 F.2d 301, 9 FR Serv.2d 41a.22, Case 
2. What was decided in the second Smoot case 
was the question of whether costs would in-
clude nonstatutory expenses and attorney's 
fees. 
Mobile Power then basically misinterpreted the Smoot 
case, which the Mobile court heavily relied on. (Mobile, supra at 
1312) Indeed, in Smoot, the defendant Fox had prevailed, and 
Mobile had only managed to unduly confuse the issue of a prevail-
ing party with attorneyfs fees. In many cases, parties prevail, 
but have no basis for an award of attorney's fees. In Utah, 
however, when attorney's fees are allowed by contract or statute, 
23 
a prevailing party should obtain them as a matter of contractual 
right and not as a matter of equity. (See Cabrerra v. Cottrell, 
supra.) The issue presented to the Court of Appeals is whether 
Appellants under the facts and circumstances of this case, to-wit: 
H. LeRoy Cobabe, et.al. v. B. Glen Crawford, et.al., are prevailing 
or successful parties. If so, it follows that by reason of the 
contract executed between the litigants, Appellants are entitled, 
as a matter of right, to a fair and reasonable assessment of 
attorney's fees. 
In Wainwriaht Securities, Inc. v. Wallstreet Transcript 
Co. , 80 F.R.D. 103 (S.D. N.Y. 1978), the federal district court 
noted that the Plaintiff was seeking a dismissal with prejudice 
which had the effect of a final adjudication on the merits 
favorable to the defendant. As a result, the Wainwriaht Court 
noted that as the dismissal with prejudice was favorable to the 
defendants as a matter of law, the defendant was deemed the 
prevailing party, entitled not only to recover its costs, but any 
damages it may have suffered because of an earlier issuance of an 
injunction in favor of the plaintiff. Attorneyfs fees were denied, 
however, not because defendant was unsuccessful, but because 
copyright law dictated otherwise. As stated by the Wainwriaht 
court: 
[A]n award of attorney's fees under § 116 
[Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C., § 101-810] is not 
mandatory but rather a matter for the court's 
discretion. In copyright cases, attorney's 
fees are generally not awarded to a successful 
defendant except as "a penalty imposed upon 
the plaintiff for institution of a baseless, 
frivolous, or unreasonable suit, or one 
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instituted in bad faith." (Wainwriaht, supra, 
citations omitted.) 
Clearly, Wainwriaht ruled that the Defendant was a 
prevailing or successful party. In the Wainwriaht decision, 
however, though defendants were allowed costs and damages resulting 
from the injunction, the dismissal with prejudice did not rise, 
per se, to the burden of proving plaintiff had acted in a frivolous 
and unreasonable manner. Thus, absent other statutory or contrac-
tual provisions, an award of attorney's fees was denied the 
otherwise successful defendant. Nonetheless, the probative thrust 
of Wainwriaht is, simply stated, that defendant was a successful, 
prevailing party, despite plaintiff's voluntary dismissal with 
prejudice. 
Other courts, despite the obvious limited applicability 
of the Mobile Power case, have been, nonetheless, less kind in 
their assessment of its merits. For example, in Schwarz v. 
Folloder. 767 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1985), the federal district court 
had denied the prevailing defendant its costs, apparently in 
reliance on Mobile Power. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals noted 
that a dismissal of an action with prejudice is a complete 
adjudication of the issues presented and a bar to further action 
between the parties, "consequently, no matter when a dismissal is 
granted, the defendant receives all that he would have received had 
the case been completed." (Id. at 129-30.) The United States 
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, thereafter held as a matter of law 
that the defendant was indeed a prevailing party and entitled to 
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a strong presumption that it would be awarded costs. (See 767 F.2d 
125 at 131.) In commenting on Mobile Power, the Schwarz Court 
dismissed the same with the following footnote: 
In Mobile Power Enters. , Inc. v. Power 
Vac, Inc. . 496 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1974), the 
Tenth Circuit stated that while a defendant 
can receive an award of costs following a 
dismissal without prejudice, he cannot receive 
an award of costs after a dismissal with 
prejudice. Id. at 1312. With all due respect 
to the court in Mobile Power, we are 
completely at a loss to explain this distinc-
tion, unless the court, in interpreting the 
phrase "dismissal with prejudice," was perhaps 
confusing prejudice to the plaintiff and to 
the defendant. A dismissal with prejudice 
affords a defendant considerably more relief 
than a dismissal without prejudice. 
Therefore, we fail to see how the latter could 
make the defendant a prevailing party if the 
former does not. See 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart 
& J. Wicker, supra i[54.70[4], at 79 n.16 
(Supp. 1984-1985 J. Lucas ed.) (criticizing 
Mobile Power). (767 F.2d at 131, n. 8) 
And, contrary to Mobile Power, in the case at bar, Respondents 
obtained nothing by reason of their complaint. 
IV. 
UTAH CASE LAW SUPPORTS THE PROPOSITION THAT 
APPELLANTS ARE PREVAILING PARTIES AS A 
MATTER OP LAW 
Both Appellants and Respondents cited Murray First Thrift 
and Loan Co. v. Benson, 563 P.2d 185 (Utah 1977) to the district 
court to substantiate their claim that Appellants were or were not 
prevailing parties. The lower court apparently believed the case 
to support Respondents' position. An analysis of the five para-
graph decision, drafted by Justice Maughn, is telling. In Murray 
First Thrift, the case had been 16 months in preparation, and all 
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parties represented that they were prepared at the appointed time 
for trial• During a noon recess, the plaintiff, Murray First 
Thrift, settled its case against the Bensons. Thereafter, Murray 
First Thrift, which also had brought a third-party complaint 
against Ruff, requested that this cause of action be dismissed 
without prejudice. Their reasoning, recited to the trial court, 
was that until they had liquidated a parcel of property tendered 
by the Bensons in settlement, they did not know to what extent they 
had been injured by the third-party defendant Ruff. Counsel for 
Ruff objected, indicating that he had been in preparation for trial 
for 16 months and that he was ready to proceed. The third-party 
plaintiff's counsel indicated he was not willing to go forward with 
trial, and Ruff's counsel then requested that the third-party 
plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice. The district 
court ordered a dismissal with prejudice. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court, in Murray First 
Thrift, affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal with 
prejudice, and implicitly held Ruff to be the prevailing party. 
In the first paragraph of Justice Maughn's opinion, the award of 
costs is telling: 
Before us is an order of the court below 
dismissing, with prejudice, counts two and 
three of plaintiff's third-party complaint 
against George P. Ruff. We affirm that order, 
and award costs to Ruff. (Id., 563 P.2d at 
186; emphasis added.) 
Clearly, Ruff was found, upon the dismissal with preju-
dice, to be the prevailing party. Indeed, that is the highest and 
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best result defense counsel can obtain in a case, ,and to think the 
result otherwise defies logic and reason. It is submitted to this 
Court that were Ruff to have had a contract providing for attor-
ney's fees with Murray First Thrift, he would have been similarly 
entitled to this relief upon proper petition to the Supreme Court. 
This additional award would have followed, given these circum-
stances, once again, as a matter of right. (Cabrerra v. Cottrell, 
supra.) 
In the instant case, similar to Murray First Thrift, 
Appellants were in preparation some two and one-half years prior 
to trial. Similar to Murray First Thrift, Respondents, on the eve 
of trial, moved to dismiss their case; immediately prior to trial, 
Respondents revealed that they were not opposed to a dismissal with 
prejudice. Unlike Murray First Thrift or Mobile Power, Respondents 
in the action before the Court at bar recovered nothing by reason 
of their complaint nor by reason of their lengthy depositions and 
exhaustive discovery. Similar to the third-party plaintiff in the 
Murray First Thrift case, Respondents below simply indicated that 
they did not wish to proceed with trial — not because they didn't 
know the extent of recovery, but because they were unwilling to 
further expense the lawsuit they filed. But, again, the reasons 
for failing to proceed were not probative to the determination of 
a prevailing party in Murray First Thrift. Indeed, where the 
third-party defendant was prepared to proceed, the third-party 
defendant prevailed and was entitled to costs. In the case at bar 
it is submitted that Appellants prevailed and are entitled to costs 
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and, in addition thereto, are entitled to reasonable attorneyfs 
fees as contractually agreed to between the parties. 
Respondents also relied upon the case of Lake Creek 
Irrigation Co. v. Clyde, 22 Utah 2d 222, 451 P.2d 375 (1969). In 
Lake Creek, there was no statute or contract which provided for the 
granting to defendant of an attorney's fee. As the plaintiff 
desired to dismiss without prejudice, however, the trial judge 
assessed a fee pursuant to Rule 41(a) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure as a condition precedent to the dismissal without 
prejudice. Justice Ellett, in a heavily contested three-to-two 
decision, deemed this to be reasonable in light of the fact that 
under these circumstances, where plaintiff could arguably refile 
its case, the condition of imposing an attorney's fee was not an 
abuse of discretion. The Lake Creek case, however, does not stand 
for the proposition that, upon the granting of a dismissal with 
prejudice, defendant would not be a prevailing party and, indeed, 
does not address that issue whatsoever. 
In Highland Construction Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034 
(Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court undertook to define a prevail-
ing plaintiff under Title 14 of the Utah Code which statutorily 
provides that the prevailing party "upon each separate cause of 
action, shall recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed as 
costs." In Highland, the Supreme Court did not finally resolve the 
issue because, although the plaintiff had recovered $10,300.78 some 
164 days after filing its action, it was unclear whether at the 
time of filing the action the monies were past due or that the 
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defendant otherwise had legal justification for not paying the sum 
before the commencement of the action. As a general rule, however, 
the Utah Supreme Court cited several decisions from Washington and 
Florida concluding that "a party in whose favor an affirmative 
judgment is rendered, whether or not the judgment is for less than 
originally sought in the complaint is a prevailing party1 within 
the meaning of a statute awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party." (636 P.2d at 1038.) Obviously, however, had the defendant 
in Highland, absent tender of any consideration, obtained a 
dismissal of plaintiff's suit with prejudice, defendant, under the 
statutory scheme, would have been a prevailing party. Indeed, a 
defendant in a contractor's bond case can achieve no higher result 
than a dismissal of the same with prejudice; and, in the instant 
case, paragraph 23 of the parties contract provides Appellants1 
similar contractual relief to that statutorily afforded litigants 
under § 14-1-8 of the Utah Code. Indeed, who prevails is simply 
defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1983) as follows: 
Prevailing party. The party to a sjait who 
successfully prosecutes the action or success-
fully defends against it, prevailing on the 
main issue, even though not necessarily to the 
extent of his original contention. The one in 
whose favor the decision or verdict is 
rendered and judgment entered. The party 
ultimately prevailing when the matter is 
finally set at rest. May be the party 
prevailing in interest, and not necessarily 
the prevailing person. To be such does not 
depend upon the degree of success at different 
stages of the suit, but whether, at the end of 
the suit, or other proceeding, the party who 
has made a claim against the other, has 
successfully maintained it. 
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V. 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS SUPPORT THE PROPOSITION 
THAT APPELLANTS ARE DEEMED PREVAILING PARTIES 
UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THIS CASE AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Highland Construction, relied 
in part upon Florida, Washington, and California cases. (See 636 
P.2d at 1038.) An examination of cases from several jurisdictions 
may aid the Court of Appeals in accurately responding to this 
appeal. Indeed, the primary function of an appellate court is as 
a safeguard against decisions which may, however innocently, be 
misguided and without foundation in law. In Anderson v. Goldseal 
Vineyards. 505 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1973), the Washington Supreme Court 
recognized that, where no judgment is entered against a defendant 
in an action at law, he is entitled to his costs as a prevailing 
party. (Id. at 792.) In the Anderson case, the plaintiff had 
voluntarily dismissed his action against the third-party defendant 
after the initiation of trial. In determining that the third-party 
defendant was a prevailing party, the Washington Supreme Court 
noted that to be a prevailing party does not depend upon the degree 
of success at different stages of the suit, but whether, once 
serving the other party, the party who has made a claim against the 
other has successfully maintained it. In Anderson, the third-party 
defendant, having been served, was required to retain counsel and 
defend the cause of action; the Washington Supreme Court held that 
the third-party defendant was a prevailing party. 
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In 1986, the Washington Supreme Court considered the 
exact issue which is before the Utah Court of Appeals. In Western 
Stud Welding v. Omark Industries, 716 P.2d 959 (Wash. App. 1986), 
the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit as against defen-
dant with prejudice. The Washington Court of Appeals, Chief 
Justice Schofield authoring the opinion, noted that Washington Law 
did not provide for attorney's fees in the absence of a contract 
or statute or a recognized basis in equity. (716 P.2d 959, at 
961.) But in Western Stud, as here, there was such a contract. 
Citing the 1973 Anderson v. Goldseal case, the Court in Western 
Stud found that under these circumstances the defendant is deemed 
the prevailing party, entitled to costs, and, by reason of the 
contract, was further eligible as the prevailing party for the 
purpose of determining attorney's fees. (See id. at 960-61.) The 
opinion was unanimous. 
1The Anderson v. Goldseal case was cited once again by the 
Washington Court of Appeals in Richter v. Trimberger, 750 P. 2d 1279 
(Wash. App. 1988). This case ruled simply and succinctly that a 
prevailing party, for purposes of determining a contractual award 
of attorney's fees, is one against whom no affirmative judgment is 
entered. Similarly, in the instant case, upon Respondents' motion, 
Respondents' cause of action was dismissed with prejudice as 
against Appellants. Appellants cannot, in all due deference to the 
lower court, understand how they can be deemed anything else but 
a prevailing or successful party under the terms of the parties' 
agreement and the pleadings on file. 
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Oregon cases similarly assert that, where plaintiffs 
voluntarily non-suit themselves, defendants are nonetheless 
entitled to attorney's fees. For example, in Ferrell v. Leach, 520 
P.2d 358 (Or. 1974), the plaintiffs contended that "defendants did 
not prevail because the action based on an earnest money receipt 
was terminated by a voluntary non-suit." The trial court in Oregon 
had agreed with this proposition. The Supreme Court reversed and 
indicated that defendants were indeed entitled, as prevailing 
parties, to attorney's fees as allowed by the contract. 
In Dean Vincent, Inc. v. Krishell Laboratories, Inc., 532 
P. 2d 237 (Or. 1975), the plaintiff requested and was granted a 
voluntary non-suit two days prior to trial. Thereafter, the trial 
court denied defendant attorney's fees, despite a broker's contract 
which allowed them. Defendant appealed. The Oregon Supreme Court 
found once again that the defendant qualified as a prevailing party 
and was entitled to its fees. (See also, Wacker Siltronic Corp. 
v. Packos, 646 P.2d 1366 [Or. 1982].) 
In Willamette View Associates v. Pettibon, 82 Or. App. 
425, 728 P.2d 573 (1986), defendant filed a counterclaim on a 
promissory note executed by Beeson and Lord. This claim against 
Beeson and Lord was dismissed with prejudice at the outset of 
trial. The trial court designated Beeson and Lord as prevailing 
parties and awarded them $17,661 in attorney's fees. On appeal, 
the defendant-counterclaimant, citing the Dean Vincent and Wacker 
Siltronic cases, unsuccessfully argued that as the voluntary 
dismissal was with prejudice the trial court had erred in designat-
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ing Beeson and Lord as prevailing parties. The Oregon Appellate 
Court held that even though the Dean Vincent case and Wacker 
Siltronic case dealt with voluntary dismissals without prejudice, 
there, was no reason to find Beeson and Lord not to have prevailed 
when the claims against them were dismissed with prejudice. (728 
P.2d at 574) Indeed, a dismissal "of an action with prejudice is 
a complete adjudication of the issues presented by the pleadings 
and is a bar to a further action between the parties. An adjudi-
cation in favor of the defendants, by court or jury, can rise no 
higher than this." (Smoot v. Fox, supra) 
Since the Utah Supreme Court, in Highland Construction, 
favorably referenced two Florida cases, the status of Florida law 
should perhaps also be considered by this Court. (See Highland 
Construction Co. v. Stevenson, supra, at 1038.) In McKelvey v. 
Kismet, Inc., 430 So. 2d 919 (Fla. App. 3rd Dist. 1983), a vendor 
had coupled a foreclosure and an unlawful detainer claim against 
a purchaser. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his foreclosure claim 
against the defendant with prejudice. Even though the matter had 
never been set for trial and there were pending urtresolved claims 
between the parties, the Florida Supreme Court held that the 
purchaser, for purposes of the foreclosure action, was a prevailing 
party and entitled to attorney's fees and costs under the contract 
between the parties. (See 430 So. 2d at 922.) 
In Arizona, in Mark Lighting Fixture Co. , Inc. v. General 
Electric Supply Co., 745 P.2d 123 (Ariz. App. 1986), the Arizona 
Appellate Court attempted to construe the definition of a success-
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ful party pursuant to §12-341 of the Arizona Revised Statutes. It 
was clear to the Arizona court that defendants who obtained 
dismissals with prejudice were prevailing parties. The issue 
before it was whether a mere dismissal without prejudice entitled 
the defendant to be deemed a successful party for purposes of 
statutory recovery of costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Arizona 
Revised Statues § 12-341.01(A). The appellate court held that, 
despite plaintiff's claim being dismissed without prejudice, 
defendants had prevailed, nonetheless, and were entitled to 
attorney's fees incurred in defending the case as well as those 
fees incurred on appeal. The thrust, however, of the Mark Lighting 
case, is that were defendants to have prevailed by obtaining a 
dismissal with prejudice there would have been no issue whatsoever 
as to their entitlement to fees, and the only issue before the 
court was, once again, whether a mere dismissal without prejudice 
similarly entitled them to be designated as successful parties 
pursuant to the Arizona statutory code. 
VI. 
THE LOWER COURTfS POLICY IN DENYING APPELLANTS 
THE STATUS OP A PREVAILING PARTY IS UNTENABLE 
Respondents, not Appellants, filed this suit before the 
district court. Respondents, not Appellants, sought $100,000 in 
liquidated damages, additional lost profits, costs of court, and 
attorney's fees. Appellants merely defended, seeking dismissal of 
Respondent's claim and for attorney's fees as allowed for under the 
contract. The majority of discovery in this case was conducted by 
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Respondents. At no time did the district court ever sanction 
Appellants for failure to abide by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure or for any action contrary to good faith in defending 
this suit. Respondents would have been foolhardy to even make such 
a suggestion. Indeed, Appellants1 counsel's letter of May 18, 
1988, reflects, as does the conduct of Appellants throughout this 
matter, the courtesy afforded Respondents and their counsel toward 
the efforts of all parties to prepare for trial. Paragraphs one 
and five of that letter are telling: 
I received your letter of May 9, 1988. 
I would be happy to sit down with you and go 
over all the documents you have promised us in 
the depositions of your clients, particularly 
the several contracts they attempted to nego-
tiate through their attorneys in Salt Lake. 
If you would provide me a list of the docu-
ments you wish, I will spend the time with Mr. 
Crawford and obtain those for you. 
In the event you want to try the matter, 
please advise me, and we will be more than 
happy to sit down with you and provide the 
written documents you desire if they are 
available to my client. You should under-
stand, however, that every hour we spend, 
together with subpoena fees and witnesses from 
Las Vegas and Salt Lake, will, should we 
prevail, be assessed against your client 
individually, as he is an individually-named 
Plaintiff. (II at 40) 
When attorney's fees are commonly allowable to prevailing 
parties, refusals to grant such awards invariably require a 
judicial specification of those special circumstances supporting 
the refusal. (See e.g. Concerned Democrats v. Reno, 601 F.2d 891 
[5th Cir. 1979].) For example, in Jenkins v. Bailey, supra, 
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appellant's counsel set forth in his brief on appeal a rather 
comprehensive list of those reasons effectively held to bar 
attorney's fees as theretofore decided by either Utah or federal 
law. The Utah Supreme Court, in Jenkins, reviewed the Utah cases 
which had upheld the trial court's refusal to award attorney's fees 
in contract cases at 676 P.2d 391-93. Indeed, appellant Bailey's 
counsel was earlier involved in the Fulmer v. Blood case, 546 P.2d 
606 (Utah 1976), where fees, as a matter of public policy, were 
denied. 
The lower court's policy in the instant case, however, 
is baffling. Faced with Appellants' counsel's willingness to go 
forward at trial with testimony as to a reasonable attorney's fee, 
the lower court declined to find that Appellants were successful 
parties despite dismissing Respondents' case with prejudice. The 
conclusions of the lower court, however, are inconsistent and have 
no justification in either law or equity under the facts of this 
case. As stated at T2, page 9: 
The motion for attorney's fees is denied. The 
reason being that it is apparent from the 
pleadings in the file that the reason the 
Plaintiffs have sought to dismiss the case is 
not because they feel they have not prevailed 
or that they could not prevail, but because 
they were under extreme financial pressures 
which prevent them from going forward. 
Under those circumstances, I find that neither 
party has prevailed, and neither party is 
entitled to attorney's fees under the con-
tract. 
Absent a finding of vexatious defense, this rationale is 
absolutely untenable. And the real issue is not the denial of 
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attorney's fees, but whether the appellants prevailed below. 
Indeed, Appellants1 counsel knows of no case in all of the juris-
dictions of the United States which has held that a plaintiff's 
economic inability to pursue the lawsuit precludes the defendant 
who obtains a judgment on the merits from being classified as a 
prevailing party. Respondents' impecuniosity may very well affect 
the ability of Appellants to collect a judgment for fees, but, once 
again, absent a specific finding of vexatious defense or the 
obstreperous or abusive use of the discovery processes, the 
rationale cited by-the district court simply cannot be sustained. 
Indeed, Appellants were more than happy to go to trial and more 
than happy to provide any and all additional documents to aid the 
Respondents in their trial preparation. (II at 40) Appellants 
welcomed trial and the ultimate relief they would have obtained in 
the event of their prevailing, to-wit: a dismissal with prejudice 
of Respondents' case against them. 
This case is not dissimilar to the Murray First Thrift 
and Loan v. Benson case, supra, 563 P.2d 185 (Utah 1977). In that 
case, the third party plaintiff desired to dismiss because at the 
time of trial third party plaintiff's counsel indicated that they 
did not feel prepared to go forward and accurately determine their 
damages. The third party defendant's counsel objected, pointing 
out to the trial court that they had been sixteen months in 
preparation for trial and that they were indeed ready to proceed. 
Third-party defendants prevailed. Similarly, in the instant case, 
Appellants spent two and one-half years in preparation for trial, 
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and Appellants were indeed ready to proceed• 
Appellants1 counsel has examined the court file to 
determine whether there is some evident reason therein upon which 
a policy argument might be made that Appellants should not be 
treated as prevailing parties. There is none. The simple fact of 
the matter is that, if Respondents ran out of funds to pursue their 
litigation, they did so by reason of the extensive discovery 
Respondents themselves conducted. (T2 at 7) Once again, the 
record is evident that Respondents noticed up five of the eight 
depositions taken and that, in terms of discovery, Respondents 
barraged TOaI^l«s with three sets of interrogatories and two 
requests for production of documents. Appellants complied with 
these requests and, a month prior to trial, worrying that yet 
another continuance might occur, offered to sit down with Respon-
dents' counsel and exchange all remaining undiscovered material so 
that both parties might otherwise have been fully prepared to go 
forward. (II at 40) 
Appellants strongly call to each Justice your 
recollection of trial practice. Each will recall that, when 
representing defendants without counterclaims, your highest goal 
was to obtain a dismissal of the plaintiff's case with prejudice, 
zealously, yet ethically, within the parameters of Rule 11 of the 
U.R.C.P. Appellants request this Court, as a body, to indicate 
that defendants, who obtain dismissals with prejudice of plain-
tiffs1 cases, even upon Plaintiffs1 motion, are prevailing parties. 
This should be particularly the case when such a dismissal is 
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obtained based upon a motion filed less than one month prior to 
trial and after two and one-half years of extensive litigation with 
its associated costs, expenses, and, to Appellants here, the 
obvious mental anguish associated with being sued. If Respondents 
are so impecunious, how is it that they have obtained counsel to 
yet pursue this ruling on appeal? The fact that Mr. Canfield has 
filed bankruptcy is also not probative. Indeed, how can one 
Respondent's personal financial affairs affect a legal conclusion 
as to who prevailed below? Appellants urge this Court that 
compelling logic and reasoning mandate a determination that they 
are prevailing parties. 
VII. 
THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY APPLICABLE 
TO THE LOWER COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT 
APPELLANTS DID NOT PREVAIL 
Pursuant to Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P., a trial court's factual 
findings "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." (See 
e.g. , Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 [Utah App. 1987].) This 
rule, however, applies only to actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury or with an advisory jury where due regard is given "to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." (Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P.) In this case, that portion of 
the lower court's ruling appealed from was entered without trial 
and absent any direct evidence on the part of any of the litigants. 
Under these circumstances, the matter comes to the Court of Appeals 
in a posture not unlike that of a summary judgment which requires 
particular appellate scrutiny. fSee e.g., Sandberg v. Klein, 576 
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P.2d 1291 [Utah 1978].) 
Moreover, it ultimately becomes clear that the portion 
of the lower court's opinion appealed from is a conclusion of law. 
As a conclusion of law, the Court of Appeals must review its 
correctness without any special deference. (Western Kane County 
Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 
[Utah 1987].) With due deference to the lower court's conclusion, 
it cannot withstand critical scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 24(a)(10), Rules of Utah Court of Appeals, mandates 
"a short conclusion stating the precise relief sought." In the 
case at bar, Respondents sued Appellants. Appellants defended for 
two and one-half years and were prepared for trial. The parties' 
agreement provided that, in the event of litigation, the successful 
party would be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee. Utah law 
mandates such a recovery if contractual provisions support it. The 
lower court, while orally dismissing Respondents' case with 
prejudice less than two days prior to trial, inconsistently found 
that Appellants, nonetheless, had not prevailed. The lower court's 
reasoning was bottomed on Respondents' belief that they might have 
won if only they had possessed the resources to pursue the trial. 
This rational is untenable. 
Appellants seek the Court of Appeals to conclude that 
Appellants are, as a matter of law, prevailing parties. Appellants 
seek the remand of this case for a further hearing to determine a 
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reasonable amount of attorney's fees pursuant to their written 
contract. The district court erred in refusing Appellants this 
opportunity. Appellants also seek costs and attorney's fees on 
appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of October, 1988. 
MICHAEL D. ISUSHES, OF 0 
THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four full, true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing APPELLANTS BRIEF were placed in the 
United States mail at St. George, Utah, with first-class postage 
thereon fully prepaid on the 25th day of October, 1988, addressed 
as follows: 
Mr. Russell J. Gallian 
Mr. James E. Slemboski 
P.O. Box 367 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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AGREEMENT OF PURCHASE AND SALE OF ASSETS 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 24th day of January, 1985, 
by and between B. GLEN CRAWFORD 6 PAULA CRAWFORD, His Wife, dba CRAWFORD 
TOYOTA OF ST. GEORGE, and CRAWFORD INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah Limited Part-
nership collectively referred to as "Parties of the First fert" or "Sellers" 
herein, and H. LeROY COBABE and LEWIS R. CANFIELD, or nominee, hereinafter 
referred to as "Party of the Second Fart", or "Buyer" herein: 
WITNESSETH: 
THAT WHEREAS, Seller owns, controls and operates an sutomobile dealer-
ship under the name CRAWFORD TOYOTA; and 
WHEREAS, Seller desires to sell, and transfer certain Assets of 
Dealership i.e. CRAWFORD TOYOTA, subject to certain of its obligations to 
Buyer on the terms hereinafter set forth; and Buyer further desires to 
purchase from Seller the real property upon which the automobile dealership 
is operated (Business Premised), all which are more particularly set forth 
on the attached Schedules "A" & "B" herein, subject to the terms and cond-
itions of this Agreement. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the sum of $20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand 
Dollars) Earnest Money herein deposited, the receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged, and in consideration of their Mutual Covenants and promised, 
each to the other given, it is hereby agreed as follows, to wit: 
1. That the purchase price of the real property and improvements 
thereon, shown on the attached Schedule "A" herein, which Crawford Investment 
Company is the fee owner on, shall t)e the sum of $4.25,000.00. (Four Hundred 
Twenty Five Thousand Dollars). 
2. That Seller conenants for a fee of $100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand 
Dollars) not to compete with a new car franchise within a 30 mile radius of 
currant dealership for the period of two (2) years from date of closing. 
3. That the purchase price of certain fixed assets, machinery, parts 
bins, furniture and fixtures to be listed in Schedule "B" to be attached 
hereto and made part hereof, which are used in connection with Sellers 
dealership, all for the purchase price of $160,000.00. (One Hundred Sixty 
Thousand Dollars). Said assets are now and will be at closing in working 
order. Such price shall also include the current telephone numbers of Seller 
which Seller shall assign for the exclusive use of Buyer and all forms such 
as repair orders, counter tickets for an additional $1.00 (One Dollar). 
4.. In addition to the above purchase price, Seller shall sell to 
Buyer, and Buyer shall purchase all of Seller's new or rebuilt and un-
damaged and unused Toyota parts and current accessories, wheels, tires ect. 
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which the Seller has on hand at the time of closing. The cost of these 
parts and accessories which Seller has on hand at the time of closing. The 
cost of these parts and accessories which Buyer shall pay to seller at close 
of escrow and through escrow shall be the current net wholesale price for 
said items as published in the most recent Distributors1s price books. An 
inventory shall be taken by both Buyer and Seller prior to the closing 
of escrow by an inventory service mutually acceptable to the parties with 
the cost of the inventory to be equally divided and paid by both parties, 
through escrow, for the parts and accessories inventory. The inventory 
will be taken in the presence of a representative of both Buyer and Seller. 
The parties agree that, for the purpose of the escrow pursuant to the 
Agreement, and subject to adjustment as a result of the inventory, the 
value of the parts shall be $30,000.00 (Thirty Thousand Dollars). Such 
adjustment will be accomplished Five (5) days after receipt of the 
written inventory by each of the parties, by payment in cash from Buyer to 
Seller, of Seller to Buyer as the case may be. Seller shall assign to 
Buyer all of Sellers parts return rights, if any, between Seller and 
the respective automobile manufacturing corporations. 
5. Buyer agrees to assume balance of Sellers one year contract with 
K.C.L.G Radio Station, and to purchase from Seller balance of credit with 
K.C.L.G at face value less J\5% dicount not to exceed $2200.00. (Twenty Two 
Hundred Dollars). Payment to be within two weeks of close of escrow. 
6. That the above items shown in #2, #3» H* and §5 are in addition 
to the purchase price stated in #1 Above. 
7. That the terms and conditions of payment for said items 1 through 
4 inclusive above, is total in CASH, due at Close of Escrow, which shall 
occur on or before March > 24 > 19 85 (30 day extension to be grante 
if financing is not finalized prior to'March 24, 1985.) 
8. That this purchase does not include any motor vehicles. If Seller 
desires to sell and Buyer desires to buy automobile inventory, as of 
closing date, the parties will inspect each vehicle and agree upon the 
purchase price of such car. Provided, however, as to any vehicle which 
the parties do not agree upon, as to value, such vehicles shall be retained 
by Seller and not become part of this transaction. 
9. Seller shall sell and Buyer shall purchase all of Seller's 
work-in progress and sublet repair inventory and other miscellaneous 
inventories (such as lubes, gas, grease, nuts, bolts, ect.) related to the 
operation of the dealership. The price shall be paid by Buyer to Seller 
at close of escrow and through escrow, and shall be based on a physical 
inventory of said assets and shall be valued at Seller's costs. Such 
inventory shall be taken by a representative of both Buyer and Seller, with 
the cost of taking such inventory to be divided and paid equally by the 
parties. Work in Progress and sublet repairs shall refer to service work 
on repair orders )customer, insurance or warranty) written by seller 
prior to date of closing of escrow, but not complete as of that date. 
Buyer agrees to complete all said uork-in-process. On payment by Buyer, 
for such work-in-process or sublet repairs, Buyer is authorized to bill the 
customer when the work is completed by Buyer for the entire service to the 
customer, and Seller shall have no claim to that billing. 
10. Seller shall retain all factory warranty and other claims, 
tax credits and claims for refunds, together with contracts, accounts and 
notes receivable. It is intended that Seller will collect all such rec-
eivables and will change Seller's address to a different postal address 
for such purposed; however, Buyer agrees to cooperate and deliver to Seller 
all payments and oio. be rials concerning same received by Buyer. * /) A i? &/^ 
11. That for the period of Thirty (30) years following the Close 
of Escrow of this transaction, Seller has the right to purchase two (2) 
new Toyota's per year of his choice at "invoice cost", the delivery of which 
shall occur Thirts (30) days or before after ordering. Deliverance is 
subject to availability of such cars from factory. This right is non-
assignable by Seller and in the event Buyer herein resells said dealership 
his Buyer shall own the dealership subject to this convenant, which shall 
be binding upon the heirs, executors, assigns, nominees and grantees of the 
Buyer herein. 
12. This transaction shall be concummated through an escrow with 
Southern Utah Title Company . Upon operning of escrow, Buyer 
shall deposit $20,000.00 Earnest Money towards the purchase price.** See attached 
On or before close of escrow (which shall take place on or before th£ s c r o w *nstruc 
24th day of March > 1985) buyer shall deposit in escrow the balance of 
the purchase price due to Seller which is to be transmitted through escrow. 
If buyer fails to make afore mentioned deposit, this agreement is voidable 
by written notice by either party without futher consideration. Seller 
shall comply with the Bulk Sales I*aw through escrow, and Seller and Buyer 
shall excute all documents relation thereto, bills of sale, and other 
documents reasonably required pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. 
The parties hereto agree to excute the escrow company's standard form of 
escrow instructuons incorporating the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement; and in the event of any conflict between said escrow instruc-
tions and the Agreement, the terms and conditions set forth in this 
Agreement shall control. 
13. At the Close of Escrow Buyer shall be responsible for obtaining 
M s own liability and fire insurances, and that gereral property taxed shall 
be prorated at close of excrow, and any escrow or documentation needed in 
this transaction, with all costs of same being borne equally 50/50, except 
that Buyer shall provide own title insurance if he desires same. 
H . All obligations of Buyer, at its option, are subject to the 
fulfillment, prior to or at close of escrow, of the following conditions: 
(A) The franchisors for the automobile and truck franchises 
presently held by Seller shall issue to Buyer new dealership sales agree-
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ments or acceptable commitments, to Buyer in substantially the same form 
as now exists between said franchisors and Seller, which franchise terms 
shall be acceptable to Buyer. Buyer and Seller will cooperate and use 
their best efforts to effect said termination and reissuance of dealership 
sales agreements. 
(B) Buyer's obtaining all required licenses and permits from 
governamental or ather agencies to operate a new car dealership at the 
premises occupied by Seller. Buyer agrees to use its best efforts to 
obtain all such required licenses and permits. 
(C) Buyer1s receipt of approval from Buyer's lending institution 
as to flooring and financial arrangements satisfactory to Buyer required 
by this agreement. 
15. Buyer is not assuming any liabilities of Sellers, Buyer is 
specifically not assuming any warranty liabilities except for factory 
issued warranty of Seller for sales of automobiles or for word done by 
Seller prior to the Closing Date. 
16. Buyer hereby agrees to indemnify, defend and hold Seller harm-
less against and in respect of any and all claims, demands, losses, costs, 
expenses, obligations, liabilities, and damages, that Seller shall incur 
or suffer, which arise or result from the use of the Assets or the operation 
of the Dealership subsequent to the Closing Date. 
17. Seller makes the following representations and warranties: 
(A) Seller is not aware of any union organizing efforts which 
have occurred with respect to the Dealership. 
(B) With the exception of the new car inventory, all inventory 
of Seller being transferred herein is fully paid for and there is no related 
obligation of liability currently butstanding with respect to any portion 
of said inventory, except as disclosed on Exhibit "A1^ attached hereto, and 
unsecured accounts payable. 
(C) Within the times and the manner described by law, seller, 
to the best of its knowledge, has filed all federal, state, and local tax 
returns required by law with respect to the Dealership, and has paid all 
taxes, assessments and penalties due and payable thereon. Said tax returns 
reflect the correct and full amount of any tax liability owing by Seller 
on said returns. Seller has made all estimated tax payments required to 
be made for payroll taxes up to the Closing Date. 
(D) All the assets are usable and are in reasonably good 
condition, normal wear and tear excepted. 
(E) To the best of its knowledge, Seller has corrplied with 
and is not in violation of applicable federal, state or local statutes, 
laws, and regulations affections the assets of the Dealership or the 
operation of the Dealership business. 
(F) There are no claims, actions, suits or proceedings 
pending whether administrative or otherwise, or to the knowledge of Seller, 
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threatened agaist them with respect to the Dealership. 
(G) The execution and performance of this Agreement will not 
result in any breach or violation of, or be in conflict with, any agree-
ment instrument, or contract relation to Dealership. 
(H) Seller has the right, power, legal capacity and authority 
to enter into and perform its respective obligations under this Agreement, 
and no approvals or consents of any other persons are necessary to transfer 
to Buyer the Assets set forth in this Agreement, other than the consent of 
the respective automobile manufacturing corporations. 
(I) All representations and warranties made by Seller herein 
shall survive the closing. 
18. Buyer represents and warrancs and such representations and warr-
anties shall survive the closing, that: 
(A) The execution and delivery of this Agreement and the 
consummation of the transaction by Buyer have been duly authorized and no 
futher corporate authorization is or will be necessary on the part of the 
Buyer. 
(B) Neither the execution nor delivery of this Agreement nor 
its performance will result in a violation or breach of any term or pro-
vision of, nor constitute a default under, any material contract or agree-
ment to which Buyer is a party. 
19. All representations and warranties of Buyer and Seller set forth 
in this Agreement will also be true and correct as of the Closing Date as 
if made on that date. 
20. That the Earnest Money shown herin shall apply towards the 
purchase price shown in #1,#2,#3f $ H» inclusieve, but in the event Buyer 
defaults in the purchase herein, except for the reasons shown on Item //H 
above, said Earnest Money shall be fordeited to Seller as liquidated 
damages. 
21. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit 
of the sucessors, assigns, personal and legal representatives of Buyer 
and Seller. However, Buyer may transfer its rights to a nominee provided 
that Buyer and Nominee shall both be liable for full performance of this 
agreement• 
22. This agreement sets forth the entire understanding between 
the parties in connection with the transfer of assets, there being no 
terms, conditions, warranties or representations other than those contained 
herein, attached hereto, or provided for herein. 
23. In the event of any litigation between the parties hereto to 
enforce any provision or rights hereunder, the unsuccessful party to 
such litigation shall pay to the successful party therein all costs and 
expences expressly including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' 
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fees and court costs incurred herein by such successful party, which 
costs, expenses and attorneys fees and court costs incurred by such party 
in or in connection with such litigation. 
24. All notices, requests, and demands and other communications 
hereunder shall be in writing, including telegrams, and shall have been 
deemed duly given if personally delivered or sent by registered or certified 
mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, or by telegram, rate paid 
confirmation requestee. 
Tf to Escrow Holder: Southern Utah Title Company 
P. 0. Box 190 
St. George, Utah 84770 
If to Buyer: H. L. Cobabe 
1 Crestwind Drive 
Rancho Palos Verdes, CA. 90274 
If to Seller: B. Glen Crawford 
109 West Hope Street 
St. George, Utah 84770 
25. Buyer agrees that prior to the Closing date (and thereafter 
if theclosing fails to occur), Buyer and his representatives will hold in 
strict confidence all data and information obtained in connection with this 
transaction. 
26. Buyer may, at its option, assign all of its rights and obligations 
hereunder to a corporation which Buyer may form prior to closing. However, 
said assignment shall not relieve Buyer of its obligations hereunder. 
27. Buyer will, as of the date of Closing, terminate those of its 
employees who will not continue to word for Seller. At the time of termina-
tion, Seller will pay to its employees all prorated vacation benefits to 
which they are "entitled at the time of their termination. Seller shall 
provide each employee with a notice of such termination and use its best 
efforts to obtain as acknowledgment by each terminated employee of their 
receipt of said notice. The acknowledgment by each employee shall be kept 
in each employee's personnel file. All employee personnel files shall remain 
the property of Seller on closing: However, Buyer shall have reasonable 
access thereto if needed by Buyer. Buyer has no obligation to hire any of 
Seller's present employees. 
28. Pending consummation of the sale and purchase described in this 
agreement, Seller shall continue to operated said business in substantially 
the same manner as it has been operated by Seller in the past and Shall: 
-6-
(A) Use its best efforts to maintain pleasant and harmonious 
relationships with all suppliers, customers, employeed and others having 
contact with said business.. 
(B) Maintain in full force and effect, at its own cost and 
expense, insurance policies insuring for their full insurable value the 
tangible assets of said business against loss or destruction by fire, the 
elements, theft or civil disorder. 
(C) Excercise due diligence in safeguarding and maintaining 
the confidentiality of all books, reports, and data pertaining to such 
business. 
(D) Grant no increases in salary, pay or other employment 
related benefits to any officers, employees, or agents of said business 
without the written consent of Buyer. 
(E) Enter into no contracts or transactions, except in the 
ordinary course of business, on account of said business, without the 
written consent of Buyer. 
29. All actions to be taken on the closing date pursuant to this 
Agreement shall be deemed to have occurred simultaneously, and no action, 
document or transaction shall be deemed to have been taken, delivered or 
effected, until all such actions, documents and transactions have been taken, 
delivered or effected. 
30. Should any term, provision or paragraph of this Agreement be 
determined to be illegal or void or of no force and effect, the balance of 
the Agreement shall survive except that, if the Buyer cannot acquire all of 
the assets described herein, Buyer may terminate this Agreenent, and it shall 
be of no further force and effect. 
31. This Agreement may not be changed, modified, or amended except 
by writing signed by the parties hereto, and this agreement may not be dis-
charged, except by performance in accordance with the terms, or by writing 
signed by the parties hereto. 
32. Time is of the essence in this agreement, and all of the terms, 
covenants and sonditions thereof. 
33. At Closing Seller shall have the right and option of purchasing 
any vehicles (at invoice cost) now ordered which have not yet been delivered 
which Seller has deposits on. 
34-. That any parts, supplies or inventory which the Seller has already 
ordered which are delivered after close of escrow or after inventory taken 
(whichever occurs latest) shall be the responsibility of the Buyer, including 
the payment therefor. 
35. All Deposits and prorates which are normal and reasonable shall 
be made by Escrow as of Closing. 
-7-
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties 
on the 24th Day of January, 1985 
CRAWFORD TOYOTA 
CRAWFORD INVESTMENT COMPANY, a 
Utah Limited Partnership 
"FIRST PARTIES" 
have excuted this Agreement 
"SECOND PARTIES" 
-8-
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4 THE COURT: 85-0518, Cobabe and Canfield and 
5 St. George Toyota versus Crawford. 
6 These are added on cases, I'm informed. 
7 MR. NUFFER: Mr. Hughes has been around this 
8 morning, Your Honor. Ifm not sure where he is now. 
9 There are two motions up. Both are mine. A 
10 motion for withdrawal and a motion to dismiss the 
11 plaintiffs1 Complaint. There havenft been any responsive 
12 pleadings filed, but I know that Mr. Hughes would not sign 
13 the stipulated dismissal of the case; so, he must object 
14 in some way to the motion. 
15 THE COURT: The matter has been noticed for this 
16 morning for a hearing; is that correct? 
17 MR. NUFFER: Yes. 
18 THE COURT: In the absence of Mr. Hughes, your 
19 motion is granted. Here comes Mr. Hughes. 
20 I just granted the motion, Mr. Hughes. Did 
21 you want to comment on it? 
22 MR. HUGHES: I donft object to their case being 
23 dismissed, Your Honor, except I hopefully would have the 
24 opportunity to go forward on the basis for my attorney's 
25 fees which I!ve expended in defending it thus far. 
1 THE COURT: Have you filed a Counterclaim? 
2 MR. HUGHES: No. But I've defended the action and 
3 have incurred attorney's fees. And the action was 
4 defended under a written contract that in the event of a 
5 lawsuit, the prevailing party is to receive attorney's 
6 fees. 
7 MR. NUFFER: Your Honor, on t h a t i s s u e , I have some 
8 a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t I ' d l i k e to give the Court and 
9 Mr. Hughes, dea l ing s p e c i f i c a l l y with t h i s i s s u e . 
10 Mr. Hughes r a i sed the concern about having 
11 a t t o r n e y ' s fees awarded. I ' d re fe r the Court and 
12 Mr. Hughes to the l a s t case in t h i s compi la t ion , which i s 
13 a Tenth C i r c u i t Federal c a s e . 
14 This case i s one in which the p l a i n t i f f — 
15 THE COURT: What's the name of the case you ' re 
16 r e f e r r i n g to? 
17 MR. NUFFER: Mobile Power En te rp r i se s versus Power 
18 Vac. 
19 THE COURT: Let me see if I can find that. 
20 MR. HUGHES: And I've been around Mr. Nuffer for 
21 about three hours this morning, and I've just received 
22 this, Your Honor. And I wish he would have given it to me 
23 about 9:30. 
24 MR. NUFFER: This is a Tenth Circuit case decided 
25 in 1974. It's consistent with other cases in which a 
4 
plaintiff seeks a dismissal with prejudice. 
And I'd refer you to. the third page of this 
printed material, which is actually Page 6 of this WestLaw 
printout. 
The defendant in this case, Anilas, suggests 
that where a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action, 
the defendant is entitled to recover costs. While this is 
an accurate statement of the law with respect to dismissal 
of actions without prejudice, the Court lacks power to 
allow costs, barring exceptional circumstances, if the 
dismissal is with prejudice. 
And then skipping down to the next 
paragraph. Anilas also relies on the lease/purchase 
agreement for justifying the trial court decision. Before 
Anilas could rely on this contract provision, however, it 
must have filed a Counterclaim as required by Rule 13 (a) . 
Now, we contend, therefore, that this same 
rule that a — would apply. Because we're seeking a 
dismissal which the Court may order with prejudice, and 
because there was no Counterclaim filed with regard to the 
claim for attorney's fees, that an award of attorney's 
fees and costs on this dismissal would not be 
appropriate. 
The other two cases that I've given are Lake 
Creek Irrigation versus Clyde, a Utah case, in which a 
1 d i smissa l without pre judice was made and a t t o r n e y ' s fees 
2 were assessed . 
3 This i s not — t h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t with the 
4 Mobile Power ca se . The theory being t h a t i f the d i smissa l 
5 i s without p re jud ice , the defendant may again be put to 
6 the cos t of the l i t i g a t i o n . Where the d ismissa l i s with 
7 p re jud i ce , as in the other c a se , Murray F i r s t Thr i f t 
8 versus Benson — and a lso a Utah case — where the 
9 d i smissa l i s with p r e jud i ce , t he r e is no award of 
10 a t t o r n e y ' s fees as in Mobile Power. But here in Murray 
11 F i r s t T h r i f t , we see a dec i s ion of t h i s d i s t r i c t in which 
12 a d i smissa l with pre judice was made a f t e r the p l a i n t i f f 
13 moved for d ismissa l without p re jud ice ; fees were not 
14 awarded. 
15 And I'll grant that the Murray First Thrift 
16 case does not even consider the award of fees, but I will 
17 represent to the Court that my research has not been able 
18 to uncover the case of dismissal with prejudice on the 
19 plaintiff's motion where fees have been awarded. 
20 So we submit that the dismissal should be 
21 granted without an assessment of fees. 
22 Other factors that would militate against an 
23 award of fees are that I am informed and Mr. Hughes has 
24 been informed that one of the individual plaintiffs has 
25 filed bankruptcy. And as I pointed out, there was not a 
1 Countercla im for t h e a t t o r n e y ' s fees r e l i e f . 
2 F u r t h e r , t he p r o v i s i o n I th ink under which 
3 Mr. Hughes would c la im a t t o r n e y ' s fees i s a p r o v i s i o n of 
4 t h e c o n t r a c t p rov id ing t h a t t h e s u c c e s s f u l p a r t y in 
5 l i t i g a t i o n would be e n t i t l e d t o an award of f e e s . And in 
6 t h i s c a s e , t he p l a i n t i f f i s moving for d i s m i s s a l , and I 
7 would submit t h a t t h a t does not i n d i c a t e success on t h e 
8 p a r t of t h e de fendan t , r a t h e r i t i n d i c a t e s t he 
9 p l a i n t i f f — t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s f i n a n c i a l r e sources a re 
10 s imply exhausted and c a n ' t go forward. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Hughes? 
12 MR. HUGHES: Your Honor, I would ob jec t t o t he 
13 Court even c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s a u t h o r i t y . As I i n d i c a t e d , 
14 I ' v e been here about 90 minutes in t h e courtroom and 
15 rece ived t h i s hand-de l ive red by Mr. Nuffer . I assume h e ' s 
16 had i t in h i s hand. 
17 If t he Court were t o even cons ide r t o d i smi s s 
18 t h e a c t i o n wi thout an assessment of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , we'd 
19 l i k e a t l e a s t 10 days t o respond t o t h e r e s e a r c h which was 
20 hand-de l ive red to me a t an embar ras s ing ly l a t e t i m e , I 
21 think. 
22 THE COURT: I'll be glad to give you the time to 
23 respond. 
24 MR. HUGHES: And, Your Honor, it's our feeling that 
25 barring that, we would resist dismissal of the claim. 
1 I might also indicate that as a matter of 
2 housekeeping in h e r e , t h e o r d e r of Mr. N u f f e r ' s f i l i n g 
3 documents i s somewhat q u i z z i c a l t o d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l , in 
4 t h a t he f i l e s n o t a mot ion t o w i t h d r a w , b u t a s imple f l a t 
5 w i t h d r a w a l of c o u n s e l . Then i m m e d i a t e l y t h e r e a f t e r — 
6 a p p a r e n t l y a f t e r f i l i n g h i s w i t h d r a w a l — made s e v e r a l 
7 mot ions on b e h a l f of t h e p l a i n t i f f s , i n c l u d i n g t h e motion 
8 in o r a l argument t o d a y . And I need t o know whether I need 
9 t o f i l e a motion for t h e o t h e r s i d e t o appear in p e r s o n , 
10 o r whether Mr. Nuffer has wi thdrawn and has argued t h e s e 
11 as a c o u r t e s y t o h i s e x - c l i e n t s , o r w h e t h e r ' h e ' s s t i l l in 
12 t h e c a s e . I d o n f t know. 
13 THE COURT: I can d e c i d e t h a t . He ' s s t i l l in t h e 
14 c a s e . 
15 MR. HUGHES: Okay. We'd like to tespond to this, 
16 Your Honor. And we are prepared to go to trial later this 
17 month. 
18 THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . I ' l l g i v e you t h e t ime you 
19 need t o respond t o t h e motion t o d i s m i s s . 
20 When i s t h e c a s e s e t fo r t r i a l ? 
21 MR. NUFFER: The 22nd, I t h i n k . 
22 THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . W e ' l l have t h e m a t t e r back 
23 on on t h e law and motion day on t h e 20 th fo r d e c i s i o n . 
24 You have u n t i l t h e n t o submit your p o i n t s and a u t h o r i t i e s . 
25 MR. HUGHES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
1 THE COURT: All right. 
2 MR. NUFFER: Your Honor, could I just indicate in 
3 that regard while still on this case, that no response has 
4 been filed by Mr. Hughes to the pleadings that have been 
5 filed to this point. And we would object to his 
6 submissions as being untimely. There is no objection to 
7 the motions, either one. 
8 MR. HUGHES: And you can see from my letter which 
9 is attached to Mr. Nuffer's Affidavit that says, "In the 
10 event you intend to go forward, please advise me, and I'll 
11 provide whatever additional discovery you may need," Your 
12 Honor. 
13 And we would be wi l l ing to do t h a t , but I 
14 don ' t want to expend another $2,000 in a t to rney ' s fees on 
15 a case in which I think tha t l i a b i l i t y is at best 
16 questionable. 
17 If I may recall to the Court one statement 
18 that the Court — 
19 THE COURT: Well, I think what Mr. Nuffer is 
20 saying, you didn't file any response to his motion to 
21 dismiss. 
22 MR. NUFFER: That's what I'm saying. And that's — 
23 THE COURT: And that's correct? 
24 MR. HUGHES: That's true, Your Honor. I didn't. 
25 But there's no memorandum in support of it. It's just 
1 the se a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t h is c l i e n t c a n ' t afford counse l , 
2 and t he r e fo re they want to dismiss the cause of a c t i o n . I 
3 d o n ' t th ink t h a t ' s proper grounds for d i smissa l with 
4 p re jud ice without an award of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . 
5 Now, h e ' s come up with some memoranda I would 
6 l i k e to respond t o . Had I had these c a s e s , I would have 
7 prepared a response. 
8 THE COURT: You've got t h a t t ime . 
9 MR. HUGHES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: We'l l see you both on the 20th. 
11 (Whereupon the proceedings in the 
12 I above -en t i t l ed matter were concluded.) 
13 
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THE COURT: Civil No. 85-0518, Cobabe and others 
versus Crawford. Motion to dismiss. 
Mr. Nuffer? 
MR. NUFFER: This is a motion that was on the 
calendar, was it two weeks ago? 
MR. HUGHES: It was on about that time. 
Your Honor, I might apologize to the Court. 
I intended to get my memorandum to the Court Friday. I 
was in Las Vegas taking depositions and discovered this 
this morning. So I had it hand-delivered this morning to 
the Court and to Mr. Nuffer. And we, of course, donft 
oppose the motion to dismiss. 
THE COURT: Is this your memorandum? 
MR. HUGHES: If it ~ 
THE COURT: It's not the original. Do you have an 
original copy of it? 
MR. HUGHES: I have — I think I filed the original 
with the clerk. And I think that's what the court clerk 
is trying to indicate. 
Your Honor, I wanted to get sufficient copies 
around, and I wasnft aware whether the Court had pulled 
the file or not. So that is probably a copy of the — the 
1 o r i g i n a l would have been f i l e d t h i s morning. 
2 And as I was i nd i ca t ing to the Court , we 
3 d o n ' t oppose the d i smissa l with pre judice t h a t Mr. Nuffer 
4 has i n d i c a t e d , we simply submit t h a t we are e n t i t l e d to 
5 fees pursuant to Paragraph 23 of the con t r ac t t h a t was 
6 sued upon* 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Nuffer, anything? 
8 MR. NUFFER: Well, our position is that the 
9 response and the request are untimely, and that the case 
10 law cited in the memorandum delivered this morning does 
11 not deal with any of the authority that was presented to 
12 the Court two weeks ago; that there was no Counterclaim 
13 for attorney's fees filed or pleading of the contract by 
14 the defendant; that bankruptcy has, in fact, been filed by 
15 one of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit, Mr. Lewis 
16 Canfield — I received notice of that last week — that, 
17 in fact, the defendants had not been successful within the 
18 contemplation of the term of the contract; so, there's no 
19 basis for an award of attorney's fees. 
20 Further, that the award of attorney's fees 
21 would be discretionary with the Court, and that the case 
22 law which was cited last time regarding the fact of a 
23 dismissal with prejudice not justifying an award of fees 
24 is appropriate. 
25 And I believe the case should be dismissed 
1 with prejudice without any award of costs or fees to 
2 either party. I would point to the Court that the case is 
3 set to begin on trial later this week. 
4 THE COURT: On Wednesday. 
5 MR. HUGHES: Your Honor, I think the cases I've 
6 -Cited to the Court from the Washington and Oregon 
7 jurisdictions are exactly on point. The one case alone, 
8 Western Stud Welding, Inc. Versus Omark Industries, Inc., 
9 involved a quasi noncompetition clause. 
10 In that particular instance, there was a 
11 voluntary dismissal with prejudice. And that court held 
12 that the attorney's fees were allowed under those 
13 circumstances when they were otherwise allowed by the 
14 contract. 
15 The Oregon ruling even cites that that ruling 
16 is — the question there is whether a dismissal without 
17 prejudice should entitle someone to fees as a dismissal 
18 with prejudice ordinarily does. And the Supreme Court in 
19 Oregon states that voluntary dismissal without 
20 prejudice — that there is no reason to hold them any 
21 different than when claims are dismissed with prejudice 
22 for purposes of attorney's fees; that there is a 
23 prevailing party. 
24 I might indicate that there is a citation — 
25 I have an Arizona case, if I may, Youx Honor. And it has 
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1 f i l e d and t h e mere f a c t t h a t because of a l e t t e r "in t h a t 
2 c a s e , t h e a t t o r n e y has been put on n o t i c e by defense 
3 counsel t h a t they would, in f a c t , seek a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . 
4 I th ink i f t h e Court examines my Answer in 
5 t h i s c a s e , we ' r e defending on a c o n t r a c t and s a y , "No. 
6 We're not l i a b l e . We're e n t i t l e d t o a t t o r n e y ' s fees on 
7 t h e terms — under t h e terms of t h e c o n t r a c t . " And I 
8 th ink t h a t s e t s up the defense of a t t o r n e y ' s fees in t h i s 
9 c a s e . I might — and I b e l i e v e t h a t s q u a r e l y s e t s i t 
10 before t he Cour t . 
11 THE COURT: Al l r i g h t . I ' l l t ake t he ma t t e r under 
12 submission and r u l e on i t t h i s a f t e rnoon a f t e r I ' v e read 
13 your c a s e . 
14 MR. HUGHES: Thank you, Your Honor. And I -- if 
15 the Court desires, I could get a copy of — and I believe 
16 it's that Pakos case -- to Mr. Nuffer and the Court 
17 momentarily. I just read it. 
18 THE COURT: That's all right. I can just look at 
19 it in the book. 
20 There i s one o the r m a t t e r , though, t h a t I 
21 want t o a d d r e s s . I s t h e r e a q u e s t i o n of anybody t h a t 
22 t h e r e ' s a r e s o l u t i o n of t h e l awsu i t in anybody's favor? 
23 As I unders tand the l a w s u i t , i t was decided t o d i smiss t h e 
24 case because t h e p l a i n t i f f s c a n ' t a f ford t o f inance t h e 
25 l awsu i t any f u r t h e r , even though t h e y t h ink t h e y ' r e in t h e 
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— ^ * _/ wi. Luc d e p o s i t i o n J * *-r ! ~ ris— - - ' T C S : a 
U,VL , . '^re r^4-*1^ — w»re not iv .. .
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"" ^ *" na xo - - - - - - ^ f e n r i a n t s have 
^c t \ - e p p r n u . . - - «^^ . -
iV i s - ' -!•: nc! - s a \ t h a t t h e record would 
lav* i *' rti - ed on t h e motic; - •>* ..;: t r e r e q u e s t .. -\c. : 
_..v.- - ^ ^ o v e r y p t _ . . . - p L 
t i i c c o s t s . 
* .iz te s f :)i is e |. 1 11: Nil f f e i: ? 
:*il\. :,l::£R: The Pakos case that Hughes cites 
1 i s ano the r case of a d i s m i s s a l wi thout p r e j u d i c e . One of 
2 t h e ca se s t h a t we c i t e d a t our l a s t hear ing d e a l s wi th t h e 
3 q u e s t i o n of whether t h e r e i s a s u c c e s s f u l p a r t y . And I 
4 d o n ' t have t h a t — those c a s e s again wi th me, bu t they 
5 were given t o t h e Court a t t h e l a s t h e a r i n g . 
6 THE COURT: I ' l l look a t t h o s e . 
7 MR. HUGHES: But t h e p o i n t of t h e Pakos c a s e , Your 
8 Honor, i s d i s cus sed — 
'9 THE COURT: I can d e r i v e my own op in ion from i t . 
10 I ' l l j u s t read i t . 
11 MR. HUGHES: And t h e Wi l l amet te ca se which I c i t e d 
12 c i t e s Pakos and says t h e r e ' s no d i f f e r e n c e . I might 
13 i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e fo l lowing t h r e e j u r i s d i c t i o n s follow 
14 t h a t r u l e , t h a t t h e r e ' s no d i f f e r e n c e as fa r as t he award 
15 of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . Washington, Oregon, and Arizona 
16 fol low both of t h o s e in t h e case of Mark L igh t ing F i x t u r e s 
17 v e r s u s General E l e c t r i c Supply Company, which i s a t 
18 745 P.2d 123 . 
19 And in t h o s e c a s e s , t h e i s s u e i s whether or 
20 no t t hey should award a t t o r n e y ' s fees when i t ' s without 
21 p r e j u d i c e , c l e a r l y s t a t i n g t h a t when i t ' s wi th p r e j u d i c e , 
22 t h e a t t o r n e y ' s fees s h o u l d ' b e awarded. 
23 THE COURT: Al l r i g h t . I ' l l pass t h e m a t t e r . 
24 Now, as I unders tand i t , what y o u ' r e s a y i n g , 
25 Mr. Hughes, i s i f I dec ide t o ru l e in your f avo r , you'd be 
1 --- * a WILII e v i u e n t e as t o your a t t o r n e y ' s 
2 : - - i ; £ j c ; e c t : r r o s s - e x a m i n a t ion ' 
3 | : e c t 
4 | THE C , . 3 : . : . " ' ' n - - " l e w i f * • - - - - - ^ -
5 ' • * ' • • • ' -
6 I .* . HUGHES: Thank you. 
7. (Whereupon r t h e ma11er was p a s s e d . ) 
8 • THE COURT: Let me j u s t make a record on 
S v. 5 - 0 5 . - , n . ijeRo] * Cobabe v e r s u s B. Glen 
10 Crawford . 
Having reviewed t h e memoranda f i l e d b^ t h e 
J 2 c o u n s e l , t h e motion t o d i s m i s s i s g r a n t e d . The t r i a l d a t e 
13 which was t h i s Wednesday i s v a c a t e d . 
1 4 The motion fo r a11orney f s fees i s d e n i e d . 
J 5 The r ea son be ing t h a t i t . i s a p p a r e n t from t h e p l e a d i n g s in 
] 6 t h e f l l e t h a t t h e r ea son t h e p l a i n t i f f s have sought t o - . 
J I :ii sixii s s t h e c a s e i s no t because t hey f e e l t hey have n o t 
] 8 p r e v a i l e d or t h a t t h e y cou ld no t p r e v a i l , b u t because t h e y 
] 9 were under ext reme f i n a n c i a l p r e s s u r e s which p r e v e n t them 
:roni going for wa r d . ' .. -
I Unde r t ho s e c I re urns t ance s , I £ I nd t ha t 
l e i t h e r p a r t y has p r e v a i l ' e d , and' i l e i t h e r p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d 
*.* I iv aLtorne^ l± fees u"d~- - » ^ - - t r a c t . 
nA
 w. , i - . . -* t o make n o t i f i c a t i o n of 
^ ^;-iat a n c j a3 i^ wi_# u u f i c i Lv p i e p a r e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e o r d e r . 
1 (Whereupon the proceedings in the 
2 above-ent i t led matter were concluded.) 
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WITNESS my hand and seal this 26th day of 
Auyu.A , lyiJl'J. 
PAUL G. f l f F T N , CSR, RPR 
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IN THE DITRICT COURT OF THE Fiy'i'H J 'II. i. , ,,.,! L L JTK ' '! 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH. 
HCM PHILIP EVES, Judge 
H. LEROY COBABE, and. LEWIS R. 
CANFIELD, and c v. GEORGE 
TOYOTA, INC., 
I 
vs. 
B. GLEN CRAWFORD, PAULA 
CRAWFORD, and CRAWFORD 
.INVESTMENT COMPANY, a 
Utah Limited Partnei'snip , 
Defendants. 
... r\_. •. ; •.. ) ji__ j_ r. r \ /j £^ T. .<-• r*, .
 t - -r . . \ yy ^  . t. • i 
Thursday, July 2 •
 ; 1933 
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• C v v . N U F F E R , E N C S T R O M & J h A . ; 
' : - A V I D 0 . N U F F Z R , E S Q . 
••. „ - L. ^ J i \ o r t n 
, George , Utah P^7"0 
V _ J J U i _ . V 
: MICHAEL L . HUGHES , ES 
. ,** E a s t T a b e r n a c l e S t r e e t 
ReO0i*Ced Sv: Px: ?TS-
?\ULG. MCM'.'LI.:v-
C "VTAL CO!. KT R..;:" u u ^ 
;J 0;. BOX 1534 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
'.801) 673-5315 
1 ST. GEORGE, UTAH; THURSDAY, JULY 21, 1988 
2 -oOo-
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4 THE COURT: The next matter is Civil No. 85-0518, 
5 Cobabe versus Crawford. 
6 I'm not sure what this is on for. 
7 MR. NUFFER: Well, this is the case that I still 
8 want to get out of after a couple months. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. NUFFER: Mr. Hughes would like to publish some 
11 depositions on my way out, but the Court has an order of 
12 dismissal — well, the Court actually has three different 
.13 orders of dismissal and an order allowing my withdrawal — 
14 all proposed and some objected to — and I would like to 
15 see the case terminated. I'd like to be relieved of my 
16 responsibilities to act as counsel. 
17 THE COURT: I've already signed the order of 
18 dismissal, and I believe I've already signed your order 
19 allowing your withdrawal. 
20 MR. HUGHES: Which order of dismissal did you 
21 sign? 
22 THE COURT: The one submitted by Mr. Nuffer. 
23 MR. HUGHES: Your Honor, just for purposes of the 
24 record, when I read — Mr. Nuffer responded to a letter 
25 and indicated that he did not oppose the shorter version 
I t h e o j.GcjL • 
i [ |',c,-ji / ,iqo of
 U j . a j . ' - - - .r ;. e c a u s e ; - -seemed :-. 
! h a t I , *- - e r s i o n . . 
iiad e a u i e i iauuc u^ s ;, jr. * ^.- a t t o r n e y ' s 
r ^ y 
-iu UUL wh< * "' n ^ j n i s s a : nac c e e n e : ; e c u t : : 
u w .. , . _ • _ „ " j i i f j e t - -
THE COURT: iz •-?- h ^ e - ^a : ;.e <- . de r a l l o w i n g 
" i t h d r a w a ! n^v^r v/ere .. . *. i IIIII 
- c ^ s e d o r d e r s wr-<* * have rot . r i g n e d . 
12 | M n HUCL
 t . •- -
ThE C C l , ^ ; S«. : : .dL was dor:*- on Ju l / I I a f t e r 7 -•-
14 I M*, HUGHEi - a s sume t 
15 J a l l t h e arqument-s 1 p r e s e n t e d unci 'were r e c o r d e d by 
Mr. M c M u l l m . ' . . u n p l ; w a u l u i ' | I H ^ ' . - I ' i 
a p p e a l , and 1 d o n ' t Lhu.uk t h o s e a r g u m e n t s w e : - p r e s e r v e d 
. - i n t he o r d e r . 
±y i THE COURT: Why n o t ? You ire an in h i s o r d e r ? 
n n
 ' MR. UUiJHh'U; I 11 11 i,; •• i -1- i 
A I i THE COURT: W e l l , I ' m n o t s u r e t h a t t h e y have t o 
22 b e . But I ' v e s i g n e d Mi',1 v Erie i, :• ""! he m^M-^i i,", now 
23 d i s m i s s e d , and Mr. Nut: Irei: i s now o u t o t t h e c a s e . '—~ 
n
 * ' made a m a n e . , • i n 
25 |
 t k e f i i e - m r a n k l y , . „ _ : . c .: z o^  
4 
grea t deal of difference in any of the orders submitted* 
MR. HUGHES: The only thing I wanted to make note 
of and I wanted the Court to note i s t ha t Mr. Nuffer had 
a t l e a s t intimated in his order t ha t the Court did not 
have my arguments in mind, or t h a t somehow they had been 
submitted untimely. And I did not understand the Court to 
say t h a t . 
THE COURT: I did not read the order t ha t way in 
the f i r s t p lace . And if t h a t ' s what you want me to cover, 
I c e r t a in ly did have your arguments in mind and had 
received your arguments a t the time I made the dec is ion . 
MR. HUGHES: Thank you. Tha t ' s the only thing I 
wanted to preserve for appeal. 
And on the motion to publish the depos i t ions , 
I have made a motion tha t a l l deposi t ions be published for 
pa r t of the record. And I would assume there is no 
objection to t h a t . 
THE COURT: Well, a t t h i s po in t , Mr. Nuffer i s n ' t 
in the case . There's nobody to ob jec t . So, I suppose i f 
you want to proceed any fur ther , y o u ' l l need to give 
not ice to the p l a i n t i f f s to appear in person or appoint 
successor counsel. 
MR. HUGHES: All r i g h t . 
(Whereupon the proceedings in the above-ent i t led matter 
were concluded.) 
"[:' "l I1 I'AH 
C E P . T I F I C A T E 
) ss . 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I , PA1 MCMULLIN, •" r a r v 
: u t - i c , I n anil i:oi: t h e County of 
35-G518 f 
T . i o . , * -r z^ r e c c i n g r a t t e r ^rs •„ 
.N CfiAWFOKI 
* o" -:n by me ... .™. _~ 
ridiacu and t h e r e a f t e r r e d u c e d t o 
.-HOY 
computerized transcription "~x<*r ^y directs. . 
1 ' LtuvL tesuiij that I am nc: interested in 
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• IN THE FIFTH , Jl IDICIAI D j C — ^ ^ 'RT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
n LfcriGY COBABE and LEWIS 7: 
CANFIELD, and ST. GEORGE 
. , -'CTA, INC., 
Ph.nti f f*, • - -. •-
vs. 
B. GLEN CRAWFORD, PAULA 
CRAWFORD, and CRAWFORD 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a IJtah 
Limited Partnership, 
Deiendants. 
1' iS '^ .:r: .' 'is suonxrea to me Ccur -^  * -<•- Motion of Plaintiffs for Pismissal 
filed May ?/i * >-- * - -rie statec that Plaintiffs were financially unable to 
c . « . . *\;:\e\e no response to the Motion 
u " ->~e 7 4 ' - -i " - a a i t - : ;.ea.. • « n e ^ j n . .. .. nied no A/inieii iespon'se hi in 
Motion - - j , , -- . -
' T • ' '• - ... -
 r _, . . ^988. a^d then heard the 
Defends \b ft^vs* .. ;. . . ^ a ~ . u. . - > -.. " iffa Thn parties 
agreea -~-?J c;smssa» was appropriate. " - C .u- then considered the authorities 
subn • r * "' "" " ^ooosition to su^ • ~:' v * - ^
 0 | attorney's fees, together with 
other objection^, ana act : . . M in . I'IIU-V i. r-it-n<iann limp in 
submit responsive authorities. 
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ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
On June 21, 1988, the Court again heard counsel, who agreed as to the 
dismissal, and heard the Defendants' request for an award of fees. Plaintiffs objected 
on the grounds that the request and response to Plaintiffs' motion was untimely, that 
Defendants had filed no counterclaim, that one Plaintiff had filed bankruptcy, that as 
the dismissal was with prejudice there should be no award, that there was in fact no 
successful party in the litigation, within the meaning of the contract, and that such an 
award was within the discretion of the Court. The Court, having reviewed the file, and 
being fully advised in the premises, now finds that: 
1. The parties are in agreement that the case should be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
2. There is no reason the Court should not dismiss the case with prejudice. 
3. Neither party has prevailed in this action, and neither party to this suit is 
"successful" within the meaning of the terms of the agreement entitling award of 
attorney's fees. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above matter 
is Dismissed, with Prejudice. The trial setting is vacated. Each party shall bear its 
own costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED this \ 3 -day of C A ^ I .- , 1988. 
J/PHILIP EVES 
Jistrict Court Judge 
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